

A Study to Establish the Sources of
Societal Disintegration
in Zimbabwe



Peace Building Network of Zimbabwe
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SOURCES OF SOCIETAL DISINTEGRATION IN ZIMBABWE
CONSOLIDATED RESEARCH REPORT
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIDS	Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome
AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
CCMT	Centre for Conflict Management and Transformation
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
GNU	Government of National Unity
GPA	Global Political Agreement
HIV	Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus
JOMIC	Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOCZIM	National Oil Company of Zimbabwe
PBNZ	Peace Building Network of Zimbabwe
POSA	Public Order and Security Act
RBZ	Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UNAIDS	United Nations Agency for International Development
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZDHS	Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZEC	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police
ZUM	Zimbabwe Unity Movement





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Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the Peace Building Network of Zimbabwe and its members.

Abstract

This study was commissioned by the Peace Building Network of Zimbabwe (PBNZ). PBNZ was formed in 2007 with the aim of providing a forum where peace building organisations can interact to further their objectives. This study aimed to provide information to facilitate a clear understanding of the sources and nature of societal disintegration in the midst of a crisis in Zimbabwe. The study outcomes would support the efforts of a gamut of strategic stakeholders such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Government departments and other actors at various levels to establish conflict prevention strategies as well as responses for effective management of both localised and national conflicts.

A combination of primary and secondary data sources from a desk review and field survey were applied in the study. The secondary data reviewed includes published literature; anecdotal information from libraries; the internet and other relevant organisational resources. A total of 4,645 households in 30 Districts were interviewed in the study survey. Key Informant interviews were also conducted targeting traditional leaders; local government leaders; political party functionaries at their various levels; survivors and perpetrators of violence; church leaders; business leaders; Government officials; opinion makers and civic society representatives.

It may be concluded in this report that, the crisis in Zimbabwe is rooted in the country's history, particularly the political and socio-economic inequalities brought about by colonialism and by the government's failure to address these disparities at independence and post independence era. Political intolerance and human right abuses have fomented and worsened the Zimbabwean conflict. Any meaningful peace process will have to go beyond top-level negotiations, and involve a much more comprehensive framework that includes a wider range of stakeholders. Peace processes will have to engage multiple tiers of leadership and ensure participation from within the affected populations.

There is also need to find a comprehensive, productive and permanent solution to the land issue, as it is central to the Zimbabwean conflict. This can be augmented by working towards positive peace that includes dealing with the human rights abuses, poor sanitation and living conditions, poverty, a lack of social justice and food insecurity. There is also need to further decentralise governance through the creation of local government and grassroots structures that are empowered to deal with community-level conflict. Equally important is the contribution of Zimbabweans in the diaspora to the country's peace process.

Chapter I: Introduction

Background

Conceived in August 2007, the Peace Building Network of Zimbabwe (PBNZ) was formed with the specific intention to create platforms and discussion fora where organisations working in peace building initiatives would be able to meet and share ideas as well as expertise and experiences. The response was in recognition of the weaknesses arising from uncoordinated implementation of peace initiatives, and thus the PBNZ 2008 strategic plan incorporated a research agenda towards addressing this gap. The research component of the PBNZ strategic plan aims to build a peace building framework and a pool of information that in turn will inform the design and implementation of civil society projects and programmes around the country.

It was envisioned that from the knowledge and information acquired and shared within this space, organisations would be able to implement programme activities in a coordinated manner, which would largely benefit the target communities. In order to ensure needs driven interventions in improving societal harmony and cohesion, a baseline study of this nature was essential. This study also aimed to ascertain causal factors in societal disintegration and the upsurge of violence in its different dimensions among the Zimbabwean society. Beyond the causal factors, the study further sought to explore strategies that could be employed to redress the challenge of societal disintegration in Zimbabwe.

“

Parents and students are angry because teachers are not teaching all the times they are supposed to, people feel that teachers are being unfair but the teachers say they cannot survive on the meagre salaries they are receiving and are therefore not dedicated to their duties anymore ”

Survey respondent, Chimanimani

Contextual Background

Zimbabwe has gone through political, economic and social challenges that have undermined good governance, peace and security. The crisis created a sector-wide trail of destruction with significant deterioration in the country's agricultural production; mining output; educational and health standards; subsequently hampering infrastructural development as well. Over the past decade, unemployment levels in the country were estimated to be over 80%, setting the ground for mass protests and general social discontent. At the same time the Zimbabwean Government was already facing isolation from the international community over human rights violations.

State closure of opportunities for dialogue and lack of political devolution particularly towards the end of the second decade of independence led to societal degradation and general dissent. The quality of public sector governance deteriorated while the regulatory capacities of institutions were also weakened. There was loss of public confidence in the government and its institutions, compounded by economic hardships. This study paid particular attention to the nature of the Zimbabwean conflict in the context of mainstreaming conflict transformation programmes into human development initiatives.

Objectives of the study

The main objective of this study was to provide country data on the Zimbabwean political conflict in order to inform the design of a peace building framework which could be used as a guide in the implementation of peace initiatives in Zimbabwe.

Specific study objectives:

Specifically, the study aimed to:

- Provide information on the past and current context within which peace building work has taken place in Zimbabwe;
- Assess the factors affecting various population groups and communities at the different levels of society;
- Generate information on peace building initiatives implemented locally, regionally and internationally;
- Provide recommendations for restoration of confidence and strengthening of collaborations and partnerships for peace, human security and development in Zimbabwe.

Scope of the study

Relevant country data from numerous data sources ranging from grassroots to national levels were gathered, processed and analysed in order to inform peace building and conflict transformation in Zimbabwe. The study aimed to identify country needs and capacity gaps in the creation of an enabling environment for conflict transformation (prevention, management and resolution).

Key questions

The study sought to address the following key research questions:

1. What is the human rights situation obtaining in the country (at the time of the study, 2009)?
2. Who or what factors influence human rights trends in the country?
3. What are the past social, cultural, economic and political trends and how have these trends shaped the obtaining environment?
4. What are the peace-related issues of concern embedded in these trends?
5. What are the underlying factors and causes of the identified issues of concern?
6. What have been the major sources of societal degradation?
7. Are there any vulnerable sub-groups, and if so, who are they and what risks do they face?
8. What characteristics distinguish the most vulnerable?
9. How can societal harmony be promoted?
10. What opportunities exist for peace interventions and what changes are these opportunities likely to bring?
11. What options are available for peace building and which ones are likely to work better in the current context?
12. What supporting organisational or institutional structures need to be put in place for sustainable change to take place?

Chapter 2: Research Methodology

Methodology


A combination of a desk review and a field survey were applied in this research. Secondary data reviewed in the desk study includes published literature; anecdotal information from libraries; the internet and other relevant organisational resources. The desk review also used a comparative study approach, focusing on interventions by other countries aimed at creating enabling environments for effective conflict transformation. The field survey was conducted in 30 selected Districts from all ten administrative provinces across the country. Households were grouped into clusters according to their geographic location. Three clusters per District were randomly selected from the different administrative Wards. Each cluster comprised of 50 households that were systematically selected, to result in a total sample size of 4645 households nationwide. Figure 5 shows the sampled Districts across all Provinces.

Trained enumerators from the respective Districts conducted the household interviews using a semi-structured questionnaire. Key Informant interviews were also conducted targeting traditional leaders; local government leaders; political party functionaries at their various levels; survivors and perpetrators of violence; church leaders; business leaders and government officials; opinion makers and civic society representatives. The information obtained from these interviews was used to augment findings from the household interviews.

Sample Characteristics

In the study design sex and age of respondent were considered important demographic variables in selection of survey respondents. Figure 1 shows the proportion of male and female respondents interviewed during the survey.


Figure 1: Proportion of male and female respondents interviewed during survey



In the total sample, about 50.2% and 49.8% of the survey respondents were females and males respectively. Generally, across all the ten provinces, male and female participation in the survey did not differ significantly. The fair balance achieved between male and female participation in the survey was desirable in ensuring the gender perspectives of peace initiatives in Zimbabwe adequately captured both male and female experiences.

Midlands Province however, in comparison to the other provinces, had a relatively higher proportion of female (54.2%)

Figure 2: Age distribution of survey respondents



The majority of the respondents in the survey sample were aged between 21 – 45 years (45.8%). This pattern was consistent across all ten provinces except in Mashonaland East province which had relatively lower proportions of respondents aged between 21 – 45 years (32.9%). Respondents aged below 20 years; and between 46 – 60 years constituted 21.1% and 22.8% respectively of the survey sample respectively. The elderly (+65 years) made up the remaining 10.3% of the survey sample. Generally the age distribution achieved in the survey sample was useful in providing a representative account that includes all age categories. Information was also collected on the employment status of the survey respondents. Table 3 shows the employment status of the survey sample.

Table 1: Employment Status of Respondents

Province	% Employed	% Unemployed	% Own account worker	Total
Bulawayo	27.2	57.6	15.2	100
Harare	27.5	43.7	28.8	100
Manicaland	24.9	55.7	19.4	100
Mash Central	19.0	54.6	26.4	100
Mash East	21.5	65.1	13.4	100
Mash West	20.2	60.2	19.6	100
Masvingo	17.7	67.0	15.3	100
Mat North	16.8	64.5	18.7	100
Mat south	18.0	66.7	15.3	100
Midlands	14.8	64.7	20.5	100
Grand Total	20.4	60.0	19.6	100

In the total sample, about 60% of the survey respondents indicated they were unemployed compared to only 20.4% that were employed by somebody and 19.6% that were self-employed. The proportions of unemployed participants in the survey followed similar trends across all ten provinces, with the majority being unemployed. Harare metropolitan province on the other hand had a relatively higher

Limitations of the research

- The study was conducted at a time when the country was still recuperating from an unprecedented economic meltdown and had just gone through a highly polarized election period which had virtually left all Zimbabweans affected in one way or the other. As a result, most of the issues related to societal degradation in the perception of the communities were closely linked to the just elapsed election period.
- The desk study made use of some position papers, which may have exhibited certain biases and subjectivity depending on the authors and their experiences in the 2008 elections. Great care had to be taken in the desk review in triangulating information from the different sources so as to maintain reasonable degree of neutrality as suiting the research objectives.

Chapter 3: Main Findings

3.1. Country background

General population data

The 2002 Zimbabwe Census estimated the Zimbabwean population to be 11.6 million, whilst the annual population growth rate between 1992 and 2002 was estimated to be 1.1 percent (ZDHS, 2007). Among the indigenous groups, language played an important role in delineating identity. The dominant language Shona is spoken by about 70 percent of the national population whilst Ndebele was spoken by about 16 percent of the population (Chimhundu, 1992). There are about 16 other indigenous languages which are commonly referred to as 'minority languages' (Hachipola, 1998). In other Zimbabwean literature it is argued that ethnicity alongside race continued to shape and influence the economic, social and political life of contemporary Zimbabwe. (Muzondidya & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007). It is further argued in the same literature that the country was experiencing serious ethnic polarisation that had resulted from a failure by the state to implement effective solutions to the political economy of ethnicity inherited from the colonial past.

General politics / political context in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe's current political context is largely a product of several influences linked to the pre-colonial, the colonial, the liberation struggle and the post-independence epochs. The pre-colonial era was characterised by non-competitive politics. Competition for power was both illegitimate and fatal during the pre-colonial period (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). To this day, political competition is viewed with suspicion and open hostility. Pre-colonial politics were dominated by life kingship or chieftaincy, an idea and practice similar to 'life presidency' (Mair and Sithole, 2002). Colonialism not only destroyed well-established traditional structures of governance in order to control the resources, but also alienated some sectors of the society through divide and rule strategies. This created social inequalities among local communities.

“There are disputes over ownership of resettlement stands between ward coordinators and party chairpersons as land boundary pegs placed by responsible authorities have been removed”

Survey respondent, Masvingo urban

The divide and rule strategy used widely all over Africa determined who would rule and who would be ruled (Ochieng, 2005). This has been a cause of most of the instability, insurgency and counter-insurgency witnessed today. Colonialism was autocratic, and neither allowed nor tolerated political competition between Africans and the white people of European descent. As a way of redressing this repression in Zimbabwe, the period 1965 to 1979 was characterised by a liberation struggle culminating in the country's independence in 1980.

Two nationalist movements led the liberation struggle; ZANU PF with its military wing the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and ZAPU with the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) as their military wing. According to Bratton and Masunungure (2008) the two movements struggled to achieve unity of purpose in their common desire to deal with colonialism. When the liberation struggle ended in 1979 leading to the first general elections in 1980, ZANU PF won, and Robert Gabriel Mugabe became the first Prime Minister of independent Zimbabwe. ZANU PF was hailed as a force for emancipation.

After independence the two nationalist groups, ZANU and ZAPU operated separately with the politics being characterised by suspicion and mistrust. The main features of the cleavage were associated with the fragmentation

of society into ethnic groups, or tribes, which became the basic units of political competition and conflict. The conflict deepened in the early 1980s leading to ZANU PF orchestrating the 'Gukurahundi' war to purge alleged ZAPU dissidents in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. It is estimated that during this campaign more than 20 000 civilians were killed (CCJP, 2007). The conflict ended with the signing of the Unity Accord between Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo representing the warring parties, in 1987. The Unity Accord was viewed as having created a de facto one-party state. Chiviru (2009) describes the Unity Accord as an instrument which enforced authoritarian rule in Zimbabwe. Effectively this meant there was no opposition to the ZANU-PF regime for a number of years. The Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) which was formed in 1989 contested presidential elections in 1990 becoming the first test of ZANU-PF's primacy, but however resulted in a violent backlash against the new opposition (RUSI Conference, 2008). Despite ZUM having commanded sizeable support during the 1990 elections, the party was short-lived and posed no further serious opposition to ZANU-PF rule.

The year 1999 saw the birth of a new political party that was formed by discontented trade unionists and civil society activists to oppose the rule of the ZANU PF government, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (World Bank, 2005). Coincidentally the formation of MDC was followed by a series of nationwide job strikes which the government alleged were influenced by external forces seeking to undermine the state and effect regime change. In response, the government began to operate through the army, with army personnel recruited into major sectors of the country's economy, media, social services and quasi-government departments (Chiviru, 2009). Concomitant with the birth of a formidable opposition was the increase in government expenditure on the security sector. Thus, emergence of a strong opposition political party in Zimbabwe was accompanied by the militarization of politics. Resultantly, the 2000 and 2002 elections were marred by violence and irregularities in which the MDC lost both elections.

The World Bank (2005) noted that relations between Zimbabwe and the international community were severely strained following the presidential elections in March 2002. The Commonwealth felt the elections were not free and fair. Targeted sanctions (primarily travel bans and freezing of overseas-held personal assets) were imposed on senior ZANU-PF officials and their immediate families by the EU, the US and some Commonwealth countries (World Bank, 2005). ZANU-PF was accused of rigging the elections in order to hold onto power. Fraud and intimidation were also prevalent in the 2005 parliamentary elections (Chiviru, 2009). In fact, both the parliamentary and presidential elections were characterized by differences of opinion among observer groups, with some concluding that the elections were free and fair while others disputed (World Bank, 2005). Many scholars noted that ZANU PF used violence and intimidation to win the elections. Mbanga at the RUSI Conference (2008) noted that police did not arrest ruling party members no matter how violent the crimes they committed were, and often the security services were directly involved in committing the crimes.

The government began to rigidly control the security apparatus and the mass media in recognition that voters were increasingly disillusioned through media propaganda. There were reports of opposition party officials and supporters losing their lives and scores being injured in politically-motivated violence. Human rights and opposition activists were not spared by the violent campaigns. Progressively, the judicial system became politicised, seriously compromising the justice delivery system (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2008). In addition, an estimated 200,000 people were displaced in the run-up to the 2008 presidential elections (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008).

Since its formation, the MDC's perceived association with external forces made its relationship with ZANU-PF highly charged. The latter described the former as eating in the same plate with the colonisers and therefore worthy to be described as 'sell outs'. The opposition was therefore viewed as a vehicle facilitating the re-colonisation of the country. The leader of the MDC party, Morgan Tsvangirai was twice charged with treason

in 2000 and in 2003 for alleged plots to assassinate President Mugabe in the run-up to the 2002 presidential elections, and later acquitted of both charges. The culture of intolerance, intimidation and violence became strongly embedded in ZANU-PF's rule since MDC's entry into the political arena.

Without military forces to respond, the MDC waged an information operations campaign against the ZANU-PF. Mavhunga (2009) states that information operations (IO) were an increasingly critical component of modern warfare and, in certain circumstances, may even become the decisive element in counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism operations. The MDC utilised mass media communications such as radio and print, internet and cellular telecommunications to create powerful weapons of resistance. Mavunga (2009) further asserts that the strategy by the opposition has been used to achieve physical effects which include the ongoing emigration of skilled labour from Zimbabwe, causing acute economic pressure on the ruling government.

The 2008 presidential elections provided a turning point in Zimbabwean politics, comparable to those of 1980 which signalled the end of autocratic colonial rule. These elections became the latest political debacle gripping the country and continent, the main feature being pre and post election, the winning of a majority in parliament by the MDC and the failure by the responsible authorities to release presidential election results early despite pressure from the international community. Votes were recounted for some parliamentary seats and a run-off of the presidential election was ordered, in which it is reported ZANU PF launched massive violent campaigns. Robert Mugabe remained the only candidate for the run-off after Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the presidential election race citing irregularities, violence and intimidation. After the run-off, Robert Mugabe was installed as president of the country. There was widespread condemnation of the presidential run-off because of the violence, fraud and corruption that allegedly surrounded the presidential run-off and counting and recounting of votes.

With no prospects of a quick resolution to the political impasse and an end to international isolation, ZANU PF yielded to international and regional pressure to engage the opposition and come to the negotiating table. This resulted in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) which was signed in September 2008. This agreement culminated in the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in which the three major parties shared ministries and the leaders of the two MDC formations became Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in the inclusive Government. Since the signing of the GPA, ZANU PF has been accused by the MDC of retarding the process of implementing the GPA resulting in the temporary withdrawal of the MDC-T from the GNU at the beginning of October 2009. While the SADC summit held in Mozambique during the same month ended the boycott, accusations and counter-accusations continued to threaten the survival of the GNU.

Security, governance and peace


Bratton and Masunungure (2008) argue that politicians were governed principally by the method through which they first ascended to power. They contend that ZANU PF failed to transform itself into a modern democratic party after independence and maintained the military principles they held during the pre-1980 liberation war struggle. Boundaries between the party and the state security apparatus were politically intentionally kept blurred. Rupiya at the RUSI Conference (2008) states that imperfect execution of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants and security sector reform (SSR) in the post-majority rule era resulted in a military that was very close to, and aligned with the ruling party. He further stated that, "For the ruling party, the military are an alternative to the mass support that sustained them until 2000". Former military commanders were appointed to key positions in strategic state institutions such as the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), Grain Marketing Board (GMB), and National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008). Most significant to the period was the strategic placement of military men to institutions dealing with election results such as the Zimbabwe

Electoral Commission. It is therefore essential to understand the nature and the role of the military in Zimbabwean politics.

The relationship between the police and the state was similar to that of the state and the military. At the RUSI Conference (2008), Goredema argued that the Zimbabwe Republic Police exercises powers inherited from the British South Africa Police, which was the tool of a minority-rule state. The police is highly politicised and characterised by extensive systems of patronage, particularly at senior levels of command. The political inclination or bonding with ZANU PF is argued to undermine the ability of the police to provide basic public security and law enforcement. The police have been viewed as unable to deal with corruption in high offices and within the force itself. In some cases the police have been implicated in human rights violations and holding both the law and judiciary in contempt especially during periods when politically-motivated violence was rampant. Instead of arresting perpetrators of violence, it is alleged victims were arrested instead, simply because of their political affiliation to the opposition. In this respect, the police officers themselves are considered to have suppressed the rule of law and promoted environments of lawlessness.

There was multi-level pressure for Zimbabwe to introduce a range of comprehensive governance programmes that guaranteed service delivery in an atmosphere of peace and security. In mid-2004, Zimbabwe adopted the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections at the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit in Mauritius. This was followed by the passing of a number of amendments to the Electoral Act including the establishment of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission by parliament in December 2004. There were however doubts, especially within civil society, that the reforms could guarantee free and fair elections. Substantive barriers remained in the form of a legal environment which placed restrictions on media freedom through the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and suppressed freedom of association through the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). During that time, the government also proposed a Non-Governmental Organisations' (NGO) bill which sought to constrict the democratic space for NGOs involved in governance and human rights activities (World Bank, 2005). The bill however, never passed into law.

Zimbabwe continued to experience further economic decline following the 2002 presidential elections that had been won by President Robert Mugabe. The economic turmoil especially food and fuel shortages also coupled by significant deterioration in basic social services delivery posed serious challenges to human development. The government was accused of resorting to repressive machinery to quell public protests. This was largely criticized as the breakdown of the rule of law; collapse of democratic institutions and violation of human rights.



In some cases the police have been implicated in human rights violations and holding both the law and judiciary in contempt especially during periods when politically-motivated violence was rampant.

3.2 Issues related to the political context in Zimbabwe

Historical review and human rights trends in Zimbabwe

This historical review is designed to illustrate the influence of the identified critical events in shaping human rights trends in Zimbabwe. The pre-colonial era was characterised by tribal wars (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2009). Violence continued during the colonial era when colonial settlers unleashed violence on the indigenous populations in a bid to control resources. The liberation struggle that ended colonial rule was characterised by violence as well. The post-independence period witnessed several violent incidents, the first being the Matabeleland atrocities in the 1980s.

As the government embraced the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), repressive state machinery was used to stop labour unrests which were characteristic of the 1990s. The violent farm invasions that were orchestrated by the disgruntled war veterans ensued in 2000 and the significance of the Lancaster House Constitution which had restrictive property rights clauses became more apparent. The emergence of a formidable opposition, MDC in 1999 was accompanied by ruthless repression of the opposition. All elections that were held since 2000 except the 2005 elections were characterised by violence. Electoral reforms were only implemented in 2004 with pressure from SADC but were subsequently disregarded. This historical review shows that Zimbabwe has been engulfed by a culture of violence and impunity since pre-colonial times.

General economic situation

During the colonial period, the country made significant strides in infrastructural development, but this benefited a minority white population in mining, agriculture and manufacturing. The country suffered setbacks in this sector during the war of liberation because the freedom fighters targeted infrastructure that was critical to building and sustaining the economy. However, at independence in 1980, the government inherited a generally solid infrastructure system from the colonial government.

There was a crisis of expectations in the country's labour force at independence in 1980, characterised by a wave of strikes early in 1980/81, as workers were disgruntled with wages and other conditions of employment. A labour bill which gave the Minister of Labour significant power to intervene in disputes and establish minimum wages came into existence in 1984. Government responses to the strikes resulted in the labour movement gradually distancing itself from the ruling party and the relations between the state and labour had deteriorated significantly by 1990. Unemployment had surged to 40 per cent in 1990 from a low 10 per cent in 1980, (Hawkins, 2004).

In 1990, the government started implementing the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), a development model, externally driven by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This programme sought to remove existing constraints through promoting the free operation of market forces and trade liberalisation. The reforms aimed to stimulate economic growth, cut the budget deficit, encourage private sector and foreign direct investment as well as embark on trade liberalisation (Chattopadhyay, 2000). The programme saw the demise of the redistributive policies of the first decade of independence that were implemented based on the socialist ideology thereby cutting government expenditures on social services and food subsidies.

The conditions of the programme also included the deregulation of labour relations and wage controls, devaluation of the currency to promote exports and financial sector reforms. It was then easier for employers to retrench workers and wages were determined through collective bargaining processes. The government was unable to reduce the negative impact of the effects of liberalisation on the local industry as there was a propensity for importers to bring in cheap foreign products. For example, terms of trade favoured South Africa and Zimbabwe was faced with an

enormous problem of deindustrialisation and worsening balance of payments (Moyo, 2000b). The manufacturing sector's contribution to GDP gradually fell, while a new and dangerous speculative economy developed (Bond, 1998).

Devaluation of the currency led to price increases throughout the period of structural adjustment. According to Dansereau (2005), food prices rose by 516%, while medical care, transport and education rose by 300% between 1990 and 1995. Real wages declined by 36% between 1990 and 1996 and unemployment rose by 35 to 45%, resulting in social unrest and strikes. The period 1997-1998 was characterised by even more shocking events; the unbudgeted war veterans' gratuity payout of August 1997; the alleged ill-thought-out and ill-timed announcement of land take-over programme, as well as intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war in mid-1998 without a clear calculation of the economic cost (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006). The Mugabe government began to face pressure from many sides as persistent inflation and deepening poverty affected the majority of the population.

To add on to the woes, the 1990s represented a difficult period which was characterised by economic duress in the form of droughts, unsustainable fiscal deficits, declining productivity and falling tax revenues, Bracking (2005). The labour movement demanded participation in a Tripartite Negotiating Forum with business and government in order to negotiate a new social contract. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) took a central role in organising mass actions (stay-aways) which eventually forced government to invite labour to join the Forum in February 1999. However, labour pulled out of the forum when government allowed business to increase prices and also imposed a ban on mass actions (Dansereau, 2005).

The World Bank attributes the poor performance of the Zimbabwe economy in the 1990s to inadequate progress on macroeconomic stabilization and key reforms such as civil service reform, privatisation, and fiscal restructuring and exogenous shocks, such as the droughts of 1992 and 1995. Other issues highlighted are the military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),



In 1990, the government started implementing the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), a development model, externally driven by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

the currency crashes in 1997 and 1998 and political tensions around the land issue (World Bank, 2005).

In 2000, the government embarked on the land reform programme which redistributed over 80 percent of commercial farmland. This resulted in the economy registering significant losses in agricultural production and destruction of agricultural infrastructure. The resettled farmers had little capacity to produce due to the absence of capital equipment and inputs. Agricultural productivity did not improve despite the increase in government support with inputs through programmes funded by the central bank. The World Bank (2005) reported that agricultural production declined by about 26 percent between 2000 and 2003 and the reasons cited were a combination of the effects of the land redistribution program, reduced agricultural profitability and poor weather. Since the introduction of the land reform, there have been shortages of food, a drop in tobacco sales, increases in unemployment and poverty as more than 50,000 former farm workers lost their jobs. This also affected foreign currency flows into the country as exports performed very poorly compared to the pre-2000 period.

The problems facing the country worsened when the IMF and World Bank suspended further financial assistance due to payments arrears. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe was forced to routinely print money to fund expenses causing annual inflation to soar from 32% in 1998 to 133% in 2004, 585% in 2005, beyond 1000% in 2006 and to 26000% in November 2007 (World Bank, 2005). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita contracted by 40% whilst agricultural output and industrial production declined by 51% and 47% respectively. Foreign direct investment declined from a high of \$400m in 1998 to \$40m in 2007. Rising debt levels, alongside unprecedented hyperinflationary economic environment haunted the government. The government tried to control run-away inflation by maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime which turned out to overvalue the local currency, and had the effect of chasing away goods and services from the formal market. Speculative activities that cropped up as a response to government's flawed economic policies led government to introduce a foreign currency auction system.



Conflict is reported to exist between councillors and the residents on issues of development where councillors are alleged to be corrupt and pursuing parochial party and personal interests at the expense of delivering essential public goods and services in the communities ”

Survey respondent, Gwanda

The introduction of a multi-currency system in February 2009 injected new life into the economy and goods and services resurfaced on the market. However, foreign currency was scarce on the local market, but the once thriving black market collapsed. The manufacturing sector moved onto a recovery path but the country continued to largely rely on imports of commodities for its sustenance. Unemployment levels remained above 80% in 2009, while inflation which hovered well-beyond 11 200 000 million percent in 2008 significantly came down.

While these positive changes occurred, Zimbabwe's financial markets lacked the capacity to support an isolated economy due to poor access to foreign financial markets and absence of balance of payment support which limited government's options to raise funds for economic reconstruction. Furthermore, the massive unemployment and thriving informal sector activities were associated with a poor tax base, yet in the past, the tax system was central to the public finance system (GMRI CAPITAL- Relentless Research, 2008).

Inequality, poverty and natural disasters

World Bank (2005) reported that Zimbabwe's social indicators deteriorated rapidly between 1996 and 2004. The Poverty Assessment Study Surveys of 2003 (PASS II) showed the proportion of the population living below the

poverty line had almost doubled since 1995 owing to increasing unemployment and decreasing real incomes. In 2009, it was estimated that almost three quarters of the population was living below the poverty datum line. Poverty had increased in both rural and urban areas between 2000 and 2009. Over the years, there was an increase in the number of households requiring food assistance.

Food insecurity heightened due to the contraction in agricultural production and recurrent droughts. New farmers were not as mechanised as the commercial farmers who had been displaced from the commercial farms through the land re-distribution exercise. Food insecurity was further compounded by poor purchasing power which was attributable to unemployment and low incomes. According to vulnerability assessments, real incomes continued to decrease since 1995. As a consequence, it was noted that emigration had also been on the rise with the population living outside the country being estimated at 34 million Zimbabweans (World Bank, 2005).

HIV and AIDS

Zimbabwe has one of the world's most advanced and most sustained HIV epidemics (Stirling et al. 2008). The epidemic reached its peak in the 1990s with prevalence estimates above 30%. There has been evidence of a decline in prevalence rates in Zimbabwe with current HIV prevalence estimates standing at 15.6% (UNAIDS, 2007). At these levels, the HIV/AIDS epidemic continues to require enormous resources for prevention, mitigation and care. With deteriorating infrastructure and also given the magnitude of the epidemic, Zimbabwe's institutional and financial capacity to counter the impacts of HIV and AIDS were severely stretched.

A number of linkages between AIDS and state security have been postulated. These range from socio-demographic impacts (such as lack of socialization leading to an increase in the number of orphaned youths committing crimes), the macro-economic effects and the inability of the state to cope with the extra costs incurred by AIDS. The situation is further compounded by a malfunctioning of key government departments, due to the severe loss of human capital caused by AIDS illness and death (www.aidsandemergencies.org). The devastating impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Zimbabwe has led to a marked decline in quality of life accompanied by increased morbidity, mortality, orphan-headed households (World Bank, 2005) and increased government spending on health care and treatment.

Situational Analysis

When Zimbabwe became independent, the government played critical roles in assisting other Southern African countries that were either at war or facing other kinds of political instability. Examples of these countries include Mozambique; South Africa during apartheid; Namibia; Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Some of these countries received support in the form of asylum for their leaders, military training for troops, and arms as well as technical support in the form of experienced military personnel. Over the years, Zimbabwe continued to broaden and incubate excellent relations with its regional partners in the SADC region and in return, these countries remained steadfast in their solidarity and support for ZANU PF. This history significantly shaped these countries' responses to the Zimbabwean situation.

SADC countries were unable to find opportunities for a negotiated solution to the country's political crisis because of the lack of consensus (Mario Tampon 2005). Countries which received assistance from Zimbabwe were bound to adopt softer approaches towards ZANU PF. This partly explained why Zambia and Botswana were the only countries in Southern Africa that openly condemned pre and post-election violence in Zimbabwe in the 2008 elections. In addition, most of these countries had not dealt with the redistribution of resources like land in their own societies and the Zimbabwean situation had a high likelihood to instigate similar upheavals in their own territories.

The Zimbabwean opposition and civil society has been struggling for democratisation for a relatively long time.

The failure by government to deliver public services and the alleged use of state repressive machinery to quell any forms of dissent along with the suppression of freedoms through instruments like POSA and high level corruption contributed to loss of confidence in the government. The Zimbabwean economy declined more sharply from 2000 onwards compared to the mid-1990s. This was partly due to the denial of balance of payments support and withdrawal of lines of credit to Zimbabwean companies. The World Bank (2005) admitted that the vetoing of soft loans to Zimbabwe from the International Financial institutions by EU and the United States was a contributing factor for the destruction of Zimbabwe's economy. Medium and long-term capital flows including direct investments dried up. Fewer international donors engaged the central government on development activities in the same decade.

In addition to serious fiscal challenges and a fragile economic and political governance environment, there was also an increase in the number of professionals leaving the civil service to work in other countries. The deficit in skilled labour was worsened by high adult mortality due to HIV/AIDS. World Bank (2005) states that despite a lack of formal statistics on the status of the public service, informal accounts, coupled with the estimated impact of HIV, suggested that central and local government capacities had eroded steadily. These factors severely constrained Zimbabwe's capacity to effectively deliver public services and were therefore worth considering in any reconstruction processes.

One third of the survey respondents indicated that in the past they coexisted with their neighbours in a peaceful manner within their communities. Most of the people who had lived in their areas for more than 5 years noted that in the past they co-existed in a spirit of brotherhood with people living in closely knit communities in peace and tranquillity. Those who had lived in their communities for slightly over two years mostly reported having lived with political violence. Politically related problems were cited by 17% of the respondents as one aspect of their lives they have had to live with since 2000 and in some cases dating back to the 1980s.

Some of the most common political problems reported in the survey were the politicization in the allocation of market stalls; harassment of vendors by municipal police; suspected partisanship and corruption by some key state actors, including unlawful arrests and detentions; politicization of food and relief aid; and general breakdown in rule of law. Other political problems experienced also included perpetual conflict between resident associations and local councils over poor service delivery; forced participation of youth in political rallies; failure by the justice system to bring to book known perpetrators of human rights abuse; internal party factionalism; and land disputes.

About 26% of the respondents reported experiencing economic problems ranging from unemployment to hyperinflation in the five years preceding the survey (2004 – 2009). A further 26% of the interviewees reported living with food shortages during the same period. Key informants in the sampled areas noted that since 2003, communities were facing serious economic hardships in terms of money and food shortages evidenced by a marked deterioration in living standards and an increase in poverty levels. Despite the introduction of multiple currencies in 2009, which helped stabilize the economy, many Zimbabweans continued to face economic hardships. Church Based Organisations, through their counselling sessions, noted that economic hardships were fuelling domestic violence which in many cases affected women the most.

Evidently, the numerous hardships and the associated conflicts played a major role in disrupting societal integration, cohesion and unity. On the contrary the prevailing situation was leading to family breakdowns and a sustained increase in illegal and immoral activities for economic benefit. A society of intolerance inevitably manifested itself in the form of political violence which intensified during election periods.

3.3 The Conflict Context: Strategic Analysis of the Zimbabwean Conflict

Conceptualising Conflict

Conflict is a natural, inevitable and normal part of life. It is as old as mankind. Conflict is experienced at all levels of human relationships. When the word conflict is mentioned people often think of either violence or war. However, conflict does not necessarily mean either. Conflict occurs when two or more people or groups have or think they have incompatible goals. Conflict is not necessarily bad and should be seen as an opportunity not a threat; it provides an opportunity for development since often after a conflict, change occurs. Conflict provides us with opportunities to increase understanding of our social structures, others and ourselves (Lederach, 2003). Conflicts tend to be violent, destructive and protracted when they are due to deep-rooted issues for example: identity, values, beliefs and human needs. There is an integral relationship between human needs and human rights. Conflict may occur in situations where there is inequality, injustice, discrimination and exclusion. The affected people may resort to violence in order to have their grievances and needs addressed.

Dynamics of the Zimbabwe Conflict - External and Internal

The crisis in Zimbabwe demonstrated the extent to which the effects of inequalities that existed in the pre-independence era were underrated by the parties involved in the Lancaster House negotiations. Zamponi (2005), states that the land question always inflamed the political debate and there had been periodic episodes of violence and land occupations since the independence of the country in 1980. Various studies have shown that farm occupations were part of the political and social landscape after independence (Marongwe, 2001; Moyo, 2001).

Inequalities in land ownership, widespread corruption and other factors created economic difficulties for the unemployed and low income sections of the population resulting in civil unrest to which the state responded through the use of repressive state machinery (political authoritarianism). It is therefore difficult to distinguish between the economic and the political cause of the crisis. The strategy of the state to compulsorily acquire the land and the use of violence created tensions with the international community. This resulted in the Zimbabwean Government being accused of gross human rights abuses and failure to uphold and respect the rule of the law, in particular, property rights.

The Government pushed through policies and legal instruments to enable it to acquire commercial land owned by white farmers. This was compelled by the fact that in 1997 war veterans protested for not benefiting from



The strategy of the state to compulsorily acquire the land and the use of violence created tensions with the international community.

independence charging government with not living up to the promise of redistributing land that had been fought for during the liberation struggles. Lists of farms for expropriation were then gazetted. This set in motion a new impetus for radical land reform in Zimbabwe and 1998 saw the start of spontaneous land occupations which were not orchestrated by the party (Zamponi, 2005).

The land occupations took place outside a context of political accountability and through the use of violence (Zamponi, 2005). The movement of the war veterans was explosive and government was compelled to embark on a 'fast-track' land resettlement programme from which stemmed the accusations relating to rule of law, property rights and human rights abuses (Lee, 2003). Economic hardships during the years 1996 to 1998 brought back the land issue to the centre of the development debate (Moyo, 2001). These years were characterised by strikes, mass demonstrations and many other forms of social unrest. The land question was used as an instrument to invoke the historical heritage of the liberation struggle, describing the aim of the land acquisitions as a measure to address the ills of colonialism. Thus, the government re-launched the ideology of land redistribution, thus allowing it some degree of dominance in rural areas. The land redistribution exercise resulted in a massive withdrawal of support by the donors and the international community.

According to Raftopoulos (2004), the land reform was therefore presented as the continuation of the liberation struggle, dubbed "Third Chimurenga". The opposition was depicted as representing the interests of the West, hence unpatriotic. Raftopoulos (2001b) argues, "Accompanying the physical violence, the ruling party launched a torrent of abuse on the opposition, designed to depict them as a privileged urban minority controlled by whites and foreigners, and 'tainted' with money from 'right-wing' conservative racists associated with Rhodesia". This was considered a political strategy that the ZANU PF leadership put in place to maintain its internal legitimacy.

“Residents are in a bitter dispute with the city council over water supplies, some areas receive water only two days per week and some have not seen any water in the past six or more months but the council still sends them water bills to pay”

Survey respondent, Harare

Phimister (2004) asserts that the policy on land reform faced international criticism centred on human and property rights abuse and failure to respect the rule of law. The alternative discourse by the ruling party defended the land reform policy on grounds of fighting liberal imperialism. Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen (2003) state that, "The crisis was articulated through political dichotomies on land, governance and nationalism between progressive anti-colonial forces and selfish economic interests".

Dansereau (2003) points out that this sort of bifurcated characterisation was "a useful simplification for a group trying to generate legitimacy for itself in the face of growing popular dissatisfaction". Logan and Tevera (2001) also observed: "for the government of Zimbabwe, economic development in the decades following majority rule had been an exercise in balancing three interrelated needs – those of social justice, capital generation, and regime survival".

The land question took centre stage in the 2000 and 2002 election campaigns with the ruling party using the slogan 'The Land Is the Economy, the Economy Is the Land' and claiming that the opposition wanted to upset land reform as it had sold itself to the old colonial masters. The objectives of the land redistribution exercise were to provide the landless with economic opportunities, create employment, overturn the country's poverty, and reduce the pressure and the political tension related to access to the land (GoZ, 2001a and 2001b). On the other hand, the opposition accused the ruling party of mismanaging the economy and poor governance.

Moyo (2001) states that the opposition accused the government of corruption and of turning the land question into its own monopoly despite its inability to solve it over twenty years. Therefore, the ruling party was able to present the land question as part of the anti-colonial programme that had not been concluded. Support from SADC and the rest of the continent was then maintained in favour of ZANU PF. In this way, the ruling party erected a barrier of anti-imperialist solidarity around its domestic political project (Zamponi 2005). Hammar, Raftopoulos and Jensen (2003) point out that the ruling party translated the history of the liberation struggle into an official discourse aimed at giving legitimacy to the authoritarian nationalism, and to the selective image of citizenship reinforced by the instrumental use of the land question.

Some critical issues are important in the analysis of the Zimbabwean crisis. Firstly, the West could not be seen to be a credible broker in the political crisis, particularly the United Kingdom because the Lancaster House Constitution laid the foundation for the maintenance of white economic hegemony in post-independence Zimbabwe. Also according to Lee (2003), by insisting on regime change only in Zimbabwe, the UK and the US opened themselves up to charges of double standards because they were not making similar demands in the Middle East, Asia, and other African countries where there were perceived anti-democratic regimes. "Regime change" was used by ZANU PF to warn its fellow African leaders that it could also happen in their own countries (Lee 2003).

The strategy of regime change totally alienated the Western governments from the Zimbabwean government thereby forcing them to influence Zimbabwe politics through South Africa. Lee (2003) notes that the call for regime change in Zimbabwe as a response to the crisis was clearly counter-productive. The Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (2006) noted that the Unity Accord signed between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU in 1987 created a de facto one party state which was progressively accompanied by the development of political and social intolerance; some form of institutionalisation of centralised rule. Consequently, the country was not able to respond adequately to the fundamental challenges of mobilizing consensus on constitutional and governance arrangements. This created some form of negative peace as there was no strong opposition to challenge the merged parties.


The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1990 removed government subsidies and reduced public expenditure in social services. Liberalisation of the economy perpetuated inequalities. According to Zamponi (2005), the weight of the economic crisis was carried by the weak and vulnerable sector of the population. The deepening economic and social crisis; and the concomitant discontent of social groups that had been further marginalized by the implementation of ESAP pushed the ZANU-PF leadership to incline gradually towards authoritarian and populist political strategies in order to maintain its political legitimacy. Kanyenze (2003a, 2003b) contends that ESAP caused deterioration in living conditions for considerable sections of the population, especially the urban population; the collapse in salaries favoured a serious increase in poverty and increased social and economic inequalities, eroding the legitimacy of the government itself. Recognising the threat of labour unrest, the government banned collective job action during the ESAP period.

When labour recognised that its capacity to organise was curtailed through state repression, the labour movement went into an alliance with groups demanding constitutional change. The failure to bring change through the electoral process and the increased use of intimidation and violence against opposition parties fuelled demands for constitutional change. The key issue was thus to come up with a constitution that limited the powers of the President. This formed the background to the formation of a broad coalition of labour and citizens groups such as churches, cooperatives, human rights organisations, and student groups which eventually became the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. Saunders (2001) contends that the harsh urban social conflict led to a clear break in the social contract which had previously existed and strikes during the period 1996–1998 contributed to the labour movement becoming one of the leading political forces in Zimbabwe at the end of the 1990s.

Types of conflict and factors generating / sustaining multiplicity of conflict

Zimbabwe's conflicts can be traced back to the pre-colonial period where the country experienced tribal wars. Since then, the country has been experiencing several other conflicts including colonialism, racial and ethnic polarisation, the liberation war, the Matabeleland Gukuruhundi war, inter-party rivalries, lack of consensus on the fast-track land redistribution programme and the unfair distribution of relief food aid (CCMT, 2004) as well as Operation Murambatsvina and recently; the atrocities committed in the Chiadzwa diamond fields. Figure 3 shows reported incidences of human rights violations and violence accumulating in the provinces in the aftermath of the harmonised elections held on March 29th 2008 in Zimbabwe.

Figure 3: Acts of human rights violation experienced in 2008, by Province



Data Source: Zimbabwe Peace Project, May 2008

Nationally, it was estimated that 34% of cases of human rights violation reported in 2008 involved harassment and intimidation. The incidences of harassment and intimidation were very high in Bulawayo (87%), Masvingo (63%), Matabeleland South (61%), Matabeleland North (53%) and Midlands (49%) provinces. The second major form of human rights violation experienced during the same period was that of displacement of families and individuals due to politically motivated violence, which contributed 28% of reported cases nationally. Incidences of displacement were relatively higher in Mashonaland Central (55%), Mashonaland West (47%) and Manicaland (43%). A third major type of human rights violation experienced across the 10 provinces occurred in the form of assault (18%). Incidences of assault were significantly higher in Harare (43%), Midlands (32%), Matabeleland South (28%), Mashonaland West (26%) and Mashonaland East (22%). Other cases of human rights violation with much less incidences included malicious damage to property (10%); torture (4%); kidnapping/abduction (3%), unlawful detention (3%) and theft/looting (2%). Chapter 4 shows a summary of conflicts that were reported in the survey.

It is worth noting that over the many years of conflict, there has been alternation of roles as yesterday's offenders became today's victims. For example, with the fast-track land redistribution programme, blacks evicted white farmers from the land which the latter had forcibly taken from the former's ancestors (CCMT, 2004). In addition, there were causal relationships among the conflicts as earlier ones were influencing current ones, an indication that the conflicts concerned were not adequately resolved.

The liberation struggle which resulted in majority rule in 1980 was guided by the need to redress land ownership imbalances and economically empower blacks. However, 20 years after independence nothing decisive had been done about this issue, leading to the fast-track land redistribution programme which began with the farm invasions of 2000 (CCMT, 2004). The land issue has resulted in alienation of the white community and farmer workers in Zimbabwe and the emergence of a culture of hatred along racial lines. The fast track land redistribution programme created new forms of alienation because of its retributive, chaotic and racial overtones (Zimbabwe we want).

Zimbabwe is characterised by racial and ethnic polarisation which was inherited from the colonial period (Muzondidya & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007). The colonial state introduced laws and institutions which defined the population into racial and ethnic groups; race and ethnicity defined social and political relations among these categories. Since 1980, Zimbabwe has been struggling to develop into a united nation-state because of racial and ethnic polarisation. For example, ethnic factors are perceived to be responsible for the Gukurahundi atrocities (1982–1987) as well as sidelining of the Matabeleland regions in development projects. The polarisation has not only resulted in tension between the Ndebele and the Shona but between the latter and other groups as well (e.g. the Venda) in Beitbridge (Mathe, 2005). Ethnic and regional tensions have also been quite dominant in the power contestations within both ZANU PF and the MDC (Muzondidya & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007).

Some repressive pieces of legislation were promulgated to suppress various freedoms, with the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) being of particular concern. The legislation inhibits peaceful assembly, characteristic of anti-participatory democracy thereby creating a situation where those who govern are accountable only to themselves and not to the public which is also the electorate. The legislation denies the people fundamental constitutional rights and this is a point of conflict in Zimbabwe particularly with pressure groups such as the National Constitution Assembly (NCA).

Zimbabweans have been battling to produce a people-centred and people-crafted constitution. The electorate and the opposition parties recognise the fact that the ZANU PF drags its feet when it comes to constitutional reform because it is part of its strategy to give the president unchecked powers and it is also an instrument that supports the culture of intolerance and other undemocratic state actions. The current Lancaster House constitution does not contain the collective interests of the people of Zimbabwe and neither was it inspired by the collective consensus of the people.

Since the formation of a formidable opposition party that came as a challenge to ZANU PF's hegemony, Zimbabwe's politics have been characterised by hate speech, intolerance to dissent and political plurality. Opposition election contestants have been labelled enemies of the revolution. The intimidation of political opponents, violence against opposition supporters, murder, extortion, and dispossession were commonly reported human rights abuses perpetrated mostly by the ruling party, its supporters and by the security forces. Widespread politically motivated violence has been reported in the provinces before and after the elections.

Household interviews revealed there were several factors causing political conflict and its multiplicity in the Zimbabwean Society. A general lack of trust between the state and general populace compounded by the scramble for resources like land, food and other economic resources were cited as causal factors. The situation was worsened by poor service provision by state institutions and local authorities, in many instances fuelling accusations of abuse of authority allegedly by some partisan state security agents. The existing differences in political affiliations in an already politically polarized society, has been worsened by divisive and hate speeches delivered by political leaders causing perpetual conflict. Political conflict was also being driven by acts of vengeance and retribution for wrongs and ills suffered during the run-up to the 2008 elections.

During the household interviews it was highlighted that political conflict occurred between the ruling party and the opposition party members. Displacement of families and individuals that were suspected to be in support of one or the other political party targeted people known to have participated in the election processes as observers; election officials or human rights activists. Teachers and health staff that were suspected of campaigning for the opposition and engaging in voter education were also subject to political victimisation. There were also cases of intra-party violence within the opposition MDC and the ruling ZANU-PF which could be traced back to pre-election period. Other forms and types of conflict reported in the community survey are summarized in Chapter 4.

Major Players in Zimbabwe Political Conflict

Lee (2003) identified three primary actors responsible for the political crisis in Zimbabwe. These were; Western governments (particularly the British and US governments); White commercial farmers; and Post-independence leaders of Zimbabwe.

The Western governments, particularly through the Lancaster House Agreement managed to persuade the leaders of the liberation war to maintain the status quo with its social and economic inequalities. The white minority were allowed to control the economy after the war as they continued to hold the most productive land in the country. The white commercial farmers were not willing to sell farms on a willing buyer-willing seller basis and therefore were not willing to share in the wealth of the land with the indigenous people. The post-independence leaders of Zimbabwe failed to implement the land reform program at the right time until there was compelling pressure to redistribute land. With the government's survival being threatened by the pressure and social unrest, the police, the military and other state security apparatus were used by the government as tools of autocracy.

The Movement for Democratic Change took centre stage as a formidable force to unseat the ruling party. Human rights organisations, labour movements and pressure groups such as the National Constitutional Assembly and Transparency International among others were some of the major players in the conflict in Zimbabwe. Non-



governmental organisations were also engulfed in the conflict, with some being accused of meddling in politics and deviating from their mandates as well as being funded by the West to pursue a regime change agenda in Zimbabwe.

Impact of the conflict

The political conflict in Zimbabwe had fundamental socio-economic costs for Zimbabwean communities; households and individuals; civil society institutions; non-state and public organisations. Rubio (1997) asserted that violence and conflict eroded or diminished the capabilities and capital assets of poor communities, relating to human, physical, productive, natural and social capital. The more direct effects of the conflict were the fatalities and population displacements. Some of the victims died, others were raped; yet others were left with physical or mental scars. These acts have resulted in social and psychological trauma among victims and their families.

Ochieng (2005) states that women were the most vulnerable in society and bore the brunt of political conflict due to their gender roles which exposed them to numerous risks of all forms of violence, particularly, sexual violence. Additionally, several political activists were forced to migrate to other countries seeking political asylum. There were also increases in economic refugees from Zimbabwe; with South Africa, Botswana and the United Kingdom receiving most of these refugees (Cooke et al. 2003).

A perennial impact of the land-related conflict has been the destruction of production capacity of the agricultural sector. Since 2000, agricultural productivity has significantly declined leading to the country becoming a net importer of grains. The fall in agriculture has also affected those industries in the manufacturing sector that rely on the sector for raw materials/inputs. In addition, the conflict created investment flight as the country was subsequently rated a high risk investment destination. The lack of clarity on property rights and the rule of law generated fear among investors while the heightened reputation for expropriating private assets was linked to de-industrialisation of the economy as companies relocated to countries where their investments were perceived safer.

The conflict also generated perverse social capital which benefited those aligned with the ruling class at the expense of positive development. In this case, the perverse social capital permeated all public institutions to the extent of promoting inequalities in access to resources such as land which failed to benefit the very poor in the Zimbabwean society, but politicians and their allies. Moser (2005) aptly stated that violence and conflict had particular implications for community trust in social institutions.

The extent of diversion of resources from the productive sector by the state through the Central Bank was not known, but indications were government could not fund essential public and social services because political priorities took precedence over other public interests during the conflict. According to Collier et al. (2003) the diversion of resources caused a double loss: the loss of what the resources were previously contributing and the loss from the damage that they now inflicted. In addition, ACBF (2004) noted that diversion of resources to fund conflicts often led to decreases in other public expenditures, such as those on infrastructure, health and education, which was synonymous with the Zimbabwean situation.

Socially, the conflict brewed opportunistic behaviour, where ordinary civilians could claim war credentials and seize land and other property on it under the fast track land redistribution programme. Opportunistic behaviour penetrated the society to the extent that society no longer operated on values, norms and principles that were constructive and predictable. The reputation for honest interaction within society was lost.

Activities of pressure groups such as the NCA helped to enlighten the population on the need for constitutional

reform in Zimbabwe. General perceptions pointed to the fact that the Zimbabwean crisis was a product of a constitutional crisis, particularly the fact that the Lancaster House Constitution was silent on the presidential term. This was considered to present opportunities for the government to do anything to stay in power. The political violence, intimidations and unlawful arrests were all perceived as part of the strategy for government to prolong its rule.

3.4 Key factors contributing to conflict

Neo-liberal economic policies

The generality of the population recognises the role played by the neo-liberal economic policies that the government implemented in the 1990s in exacerbating the conflict. There were no redistributive mechanisms in the economy and the fact that the government implemented these policies with pressure from the IMF and the World Bank makes the government not absolutely at fault for the adverse impacts that the policies had on the population. In this case, some sections of the Zimbabwean society blame the Bretton Woods institutions for failing to analyse global forces and the specific situation of the country before ESAP was imposed on the country. This is especially so given the fact that Structural Adjustment Programmes have not proven useful in most parts of the world, where they have been implemented.

“There are land disputes because of the unfair allocation of land only ruling party supporters have benefited from”

Survey respondent, Kwekwe

National sovereignty

Gavin (2007) and Chitiyo (2007) observe the high level of discussion around the issue of sovereignty is much within Zimbabwe and that this is considered a legitimate and important issue. Threats of possible international military intervention propped up the issue of sovereignty juxtaposing it in prominence with the question of race and land. The media has reinforced the importance that government places on sovereignty and the population is continuously told that there exists a conspiracy to strip the country of its resources. Even within the opposition itself, sovereignty has been held paramount in as much as the issue of democracy, good governance and human right is. This realisation forms the basis of the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) as well as support from SADC countries.

3.5 An evaluation of national efforts to promote peace and co-existence

Since the attainment of independence in 1980, there have been three notable attempts at reconciliation. In 1980 there was an attempt to come up with a policy to reconcile blacks and whites after 90 years of colonial subjugation of the former by the latter. Zimbabweans also witnessed the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987 between ZAPU and ZANU PF, a settlement that sought to ‘unite’ the two major tribal groups, the Shona and the Ndebele. More recently, on the 15th of September 2008, the Principals of the three main political parties in Zimbabwe, ZANU PF and the two MDC formations signed the Global Political Agreement (GPA).

The 1980 policy of reconciliation was considered a failure because it lacked the mechanisms for its implementation. The 1987 Unity Accord was similarly considered a failure because of its lack of involvement of the grassroots level in its planning and implementation. Over the years there have been constant threats for the revival of ZAPU as there were still some elements that were not satisfied with the merger of ZANU PF and ZAPU. Discontent emanated from feelings of betrayal by political leadership and alleged neglect of Gukurahundi atrocities. The Unity Accord therefore managed to avert violence but did not bring durable peace.

In 2008 Zimbabweans welcomed the signing of the GPA in the hope and belief that conflict and violence would immediately come to an end. This was however not the case as there were allegations of continued disregard of the rule of law as well as disrespect of the GPA by the concerned political parties. For example it is alleged MDC top officials continued to be arrested and harassed over trumped-up charges with MDC-T at some point also threatening to pull out of the GPA (Sunday News, October 18 2009).

Both the Unity Accord of 1987 and the 2008 GPA can be regarded as top-down approaches to peace-building aiming to achieve a negotiated settlement between the principal high-level leaders of the parties involved in conflict. In these high-level negotiations, elite leaders were brought to a bargaining table in attempt to work toward new solutions. The negotiations had an immediate goal of bringing to an end all hostilities that existed amongst the political parties and their supporters. The GPA also aimed to initiate a national transition, which involved the implementation of a framework by the political leadership that would allow for democratic elections. Central to the framework were electoral and constitutional reforms agreed to by all parties signatory to the agreement. Peace-building at this level involved a step-by-step, issue-oriented, and short-term achievement process.

The 2008 agreement was riddled with general lack of trust and inherent suspicion among the political parties. The conditions contained in the agreement were not all implemented to the letter and in some instances, parties failed to meet the deadlines for implementation of the agreed terms. Gershman (2009) stated that if it were to be judged whether there had been substantial transfer of power, the available evidence suggested ZANU-PF had retained most of the key levers. The ZANU-PF's firm control of the police, army, judiciary, broadcast media and all daily newspapers were cases in point. Other cases believed to be a violation of the GPA were the unilateral appointment of Provincial Governors, Permanent Secretaries and Ambassadors, as well as re-appointments of Central Bank Governor and Attorney General. Arrests of opposition activists and MDC Deputy Minister for Agriculture were perceived as attempts to undermine the meaningful reform expected through the GPA.

The GPA was considered technocratic as it involved just the leaders of the three main political parties—the elite and SADC as the guarantor of the agreement. John Paul Lederach in his peace building pyramid argued that peace building needed to be done at three levels: - the elite, the middle level (e.g., NGOs, academics) and the bottom level (grassroots). In the same literature, the bottom-up approach to peace building was preferred to a top-down approach (technocratic approach). It is argued that peace builders should not ignore local initiatives and cultural resources if sustainable peace is to be achieved (Lederach, 1997).

The lack of involvement of bottom level (grassroots) in the peace building efforts was evidenced by the significantly low proportion (30%) of survey respondents that actually knew of any peace building initiatives that were taking place. The national processes that were known to the few included the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration; the constitutional making process; and the formation of the Government of National Unity. Two thirds of the respondents expressed lack of any knowledge on the national processes constituted to resolve the political conflicts experienced pre and post 2008 elections.

Several Civic Society Organisations have been working towards peace building in Zimbabwe, with a fair number of these organisations being newly formed whilst some were formed as way back as 1980s. The main areas of focus have varied from one organisation to the other but more generally include such sectors as policy and advocacy; human rights; poverty alleviation; good governance and democracy; women and child protection; legal services and HIV/AIDS programming. The geographic coverage for civic society organisations ranges from community based to District, Provincial and National levels.

The Zimbabwe Community Development Trust has been working with victims of violence and torture to develop a platform that allows victims to present their concerns to leading political and civil society actors. Savanna Trust continues to train theatre groups to promote civic education among audiences of Zimbabwe's high-density suburbs and rural areas. Youth Agenda and the Student Christian Movement of Zimbabwe have been conducting nationwide programs of workshops, rallies, and focus group discussions with youth and students. Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights has been running national campaigns focusing on electoral reform, unbiased media coverage, organising victims of Operation Murambatsvina and farm invasions, and providing legal support to human rights defenders. A more comprehensive list of organisations involved in peace building work is shown in Chapter 6.

The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and other contributing donors implemented the Protracted Relief Programme in Zimbabwe in which NGOs, private sector organisations and other third parties were engaged in an effort to find ways to deliver assistance to the needy populations in the country. Services were however not delivered through the Zimbabwean government leading to the recognition that coordination and communication with government at all levels, especially local and provincial was essential to the success of PRP. The main aim of PRP was to enhance the ability of vulnerable people to meet their food needs, while also promoting health, education and livelihoods in contribution to the attainment of Millennium Development Goal 1, "Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty".

3.6 Sectoral Actors in the peace building process

The review of peace building initiatives at local and national levels as well as regionally and internationally shows various institutions were operating in different sectors of peace building programming. These mainly included global institutions; state actors (government); universities; churches; media; civic society organisations; traditional leaders; and grassroots communities.

The role of global institutions

Global institutions should take up the following roles in the peace building process:

- Focus on high-level negotiations led by highly visible mediators to promote open discussions on strategies to end the conflict; including reconstruction processes and financing opportunities for post-conflict programmes.
- Develop the groundwork to establish a sustainable professional network that can facilitate the sharing of information and knowledge among international and regional peace building institutions, mediators and experts in conflict prevention and management.
- Bring together key players from regional organisations, civil society, and government and expert leadership institutions to formulate development and reconstruction programmes.
- Monitor the implementation of international conventions; recommendations of agreed pacts as well as building sustainable partnerships to transform conflict constructively in the country.
- Promote constructive dialogue as a tool for enhancing democratic participation and good governance.
- Empower civic society for development effectiveness.

The role of government

The government has the role of creating an enabling environment for reconstruction processes to be effective. According to Ochieng (2005) the government should also invest in changing the perception of communities for sustainable peace to be achieved. Since policies and laws alone cannot succeed in building sustainable peace, it is important for governments to also invest and budget for civic education and empowerment. More specifically, government should:

- Create an enabling environment for the implementation of multi-faceted approaches in peace-building and reconstruction projects through appropriate policies.

- Deal with community perceptions; civic education should be part of government's plan and budgets.
- Mobilise resources for the rehabilitation of victims of violations; physical and mental healing is a prerequisite to sustainable peace building.
- Draw the road map for peace transformation, which should be discussed nationally by all stakeholders, including grassroots structures.
- Show commitment to addressing the root causes of conflict rather than symptoms of conflict through exercising transparency and democratic governance.
- Institutionalise traditional conflict management mechanisms.
- Develop systems including decentralisation of governance through the creation of local government and grassroots structures.
- Streamline conflict prevention and management in public institutions.
- Use conflict warning systems to conduct early conflict analysis.
- Dismantle structures used to perpetuate conflict.
- Implement major reforms in the state security and judiciary sectors.

The role of universities

The role of universities should go beyond the academic debates to being active agents of change and social transformation. According to Delgado (2008) universities should be defenders of human rights and promoters of a peace culture and education. Additionally, they should be training centres for decision-makers in charge of public policy formulation for structuring a positive peace. Universities should also be committed to researching, analysing and finding solutions to conflicts and should:

- Take a leading role in developing concrete development proposals through participating in the analysis, reflection and debate about the possible post-conflict development scenarios.
- Provide technical expertise in the design and implementation of interventions that are part of the peace inclusive agenda with specific strategies for ensuring community participation, structural feasibility, their effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and sustainability.
- Lead culture and education peace campaigns.
- Partake in research activities related to conflict analysis and capacity development.
- Become knowledge centres from which solutions for sustainable peace originate.
- Play the role of facilitators and public debate promoters about the possible and feasible paths to overcome impasses/conflict.

The role of the church

The church is a major component that binds people together for cooperative action. The history of the church in responding to people's social needs cannot be overemphasised, particularly supporting those in need. As an institution, the church is best-placed to promote love, justice, peace, and reconciliation/forgiveness and social values. In Zimbabwe, the Church has always been engaged in nation-building through the schools, hospitals, relief and development programs. Below are some of the roles that the church should assume in the reconstruction process:

- Teach about the responsibilities of good citizens, the respect and value that should be given to life and the importance of protecting it. This is a useful means of raising the conscience of the people and educating people especially during periods of social unrest and conflict.
- Support programmes and initiatives designed to inculcate a culture of peace among people of different tribes and political inclinations which is critical for successful social transformation.
- Actively advocate the dismantling of the structures that promote corruption and any other immoral behaviour that negate the values of love, justice, peace and reconciliation.
- Take a lead in national healing processes.

- Mediate in political processes to establish and strengthen understanding between the parties involved in the conflict.
- Play a leading role in condemning violence and other excesses by parties involved in the conflict; should not approve of violent movements.
- Rehabilitate and shelter those rendered homeless, offer spiritual and emotional support to victims of violence and other human rights abuses.

The role of the media

The media has a critical influence on the character of society. The journalistic quality of the news media can determine how society responds to the challenges that it faces, that is, whether to resort to violence or not. Given their influence, socially responsible reporting is imperative in the reconstruction process and the media should critically review messages on conflict as well as coverage of peace-building efforts within communities and at national level and should:

- Serve an informing and educating function by securing a free flow of accurate and constructive information, counteracting misconceptions, identifying the interests underlying the issues and helping to build consensus—may include providing information about human rights, principles of good governance, parliamentary democracy and democratic elections.
- Act as a watchdog on leaders to help ensure long-term accountability, monitor human rights violations and provide some early warning on potential escalations of the conflicts
- Implement programmes designed to transformation mentalities, attitudes, perceptions etc and this is a critical role since the media has potential to reach large numbers.
- Organise workshops/press conferences to diffuse inflammatory coverage

The role of civil society

Civil society should actively participate in monitoring and evaluating government performance in the implementation of the international instruments they ratify. In this respect, civil society should devise strategies and implement a broad range of activities with a long-term focus to address the root causes and consequences of political conflict, and to promote a culture of peace among the population. They should network, build strategic alliances and formulate strategies and advocate redress for survivors of human rights abuse. Such linkages are instrumental for effective planning for successful long-term interventions by institutions with adequate capacity and relevant competences. The following are some of the roles that civil society should play:

- Train institutions, individual experts, grassroots leadership, and provide them with skills in their understanding of how to use international and regional human rights instruments in their advocacy work as a way of them for engagement in peace-building and negotiation processes.
- Promote the development of reliable mass communication mechanisms that are locally-focused and that address the needs of communities.
- Finance and facilitate dialogue workshops and negotiations (peacemaking), networking and implementing initiatives for cross-cultural understanding and relationship building.
- Engage in early warning activities, identify and support preventive diplomacy through third-party intervention.
- Influence technocrats to get involved in the redress and justice process.
- Contribute to maintaining or improving relationships among stakeholders and parties involved in conflicts.
- Facilitate broader public participation in peace agreement negotiations and constitutional reform processes.
- Human rights monitoring and monitoring of elections and state institutions and activities related to democracy and good governance.
- Implement activities designed to empower and develop skills among the youths (community-based social policy, income-generation, education and skills development)

- Establish peace cultures: incentives for overcoming cultures of war through arts, music, films and cultural events.
- Strengthen local “peace constituencies”.
- Protect victims/potential victims and providing security and rehabilitation of victims.
- Document crimes committed during conflicts, fact-finding and identifying victims and dealing with trauma and psycho-social support for victims.
- Initiating and financing the capacity development or building for public and private institutions. Developing common standards and principles (“codes of conduct”) in the field of peace work.
- Promote the independence of civil society.

The role of diplomatic missions

Diplomatic missions have a role to maintain relationships between their governments and Zimbabwe, particularly in promoting bilateral partnerships. Below are some of the critical roles that diplomatic missions can play in the peace-building process:

- Engage the government and opposition so that Zimbabwe can find a common solution to their political problems.
- Play an advisory role on matters of good governance, institutional democracy and development.
- Train leaders of institutions, conduct other capacity-development work as well as strengthen civil society.
- Provide funding for peace programmes and activities to promote dialogue, reinforce human rights, promote gender equality, and push for democratic governance.
- Monitor the implementation of international conventions relating to democratic development, the rule of law and human rights.

The role of traditional leaders and the grassroots

As old institutions of governance, traditional authorities can play a central role conflict prevention and management. They are the custodians of customary law, moral principles and cultural values in Zimbabwean societies. Traditional leaders are in a strategic position of influence in their constituencies and it is therefore important to involve them in all local peace building projects because they can address matters of community building and identity formation due to their close proximity to individuals, and so can impact positively on democracy and development. Projects in which they are involved are more likely to be received by the people that they lead thereby resulting in enduring peace and stability. They know and can use traditional methods to unite their people and create a common vision for the community. Grassroots organisations can play the following roles in the reconstruction process:

- Identify local underlying causes of conflict that will help peace builders in the development of appropriate interventions.
- Through traditional leaders, encourage open dialogue to promote peace and reconciliation and initiate relevant programmes.
- Participate in the assessment of community needs, identification of victims of violence and provision of support.
- Providing community education on topics such as trauma and rehabilitation/recovery, communication skills, and the role of individuals, families, communities and local government in peace building.
- Coordinate community-based peace building efforts at the local level as the state is often a party to the conflict.
- Participate in the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure and property.
- Participate in promoting works of art and culture such as drama.

Figure 4: Roles played by traditional leaders




Figure 4 shows the communities' perception on the roles played by traditional leaders. The majority of respondents (49%) described traditional leaders as being used by politicians to spearhead partisan politics. These proportions were relatively higher in Mashonaland Central (52.3%) and Masvingo (52.0%) provinces. Another 29.2% of communities described traditional leaders to be presiding over traditional and customary issues whilst the remaining 22% indicated traditional leaders were involved in settling disputes at local level. More generally, the results showed traditional leaders who were expected to be custodians of culture in their communities were in actual fact participating in party politics making them less effective in management of political conflict at community level. Peace building initiatives should thus make a strong effort in promoting the proper roles of traditional leaders as they play an integral part in grassroots peace building initiatives.

3.6.1 Factors inhibiting Sector Players from undertaking their peace building roles

There were several factors that were observed to hinder the undertaking of the above-mentioned peace-building roles by the different sectoral players. Some of these factors were:

Lack of willpower – The government and policy makers have not adequately created an enabling environment to promote peace building efforts, particularly at grassroots level.

Manipulation – traditional leaders have been allegedly manipulated through party politics to become accountable for the voting decisions of their local constituencies and to identify and punish those in opposition.

Mistrust – There has been a general mistrust between stakeholders. For example, Government is sceptical about the idea of the civic society engaging with the grassroots with fears that the latter would aim to influence the grassroots to vote the opposition into power.

Partisanship – Some civic organisations have tended to ally with opposition parties and become more like political parties. Similarly, some Christian leaders have aligned with political parties. Such divisions on ideological and political lines make it difficult for the church to reconcile both political leaders and the ordinary people.

Bias – The state-owned media has been largely viewed as partisan, loyal only to ZANU PF and subsequently propagating the party's propaganda, whilst conversely; the independent media has aligned with MDC formations.

3.7 Review of peace initiatives implemented in other countries

There are some lessons that Zimbabwe can draw from experiences of other countries that have been involved in

conflict situations. Whilst these countries' internal and external circumstances varied, the principles that the various peace-builders applied are very important. This section summarises some of the peace initiatives implemented in Mozambique, Uganda, Angola and other countries in brief.

Mozambique

Mozambique's conflict started around the 1960s. A negotiated end to the conflict was given serious consideration in 1986. Kenya and Zimbabwe through Moi and Mugabe facilitated the talks between the Government and Renamo in Nairobi. The Mozambican government also set in motion a major review of Frelimo's economic, foreign and civil rights policies. Chissano also gave permission to senior leaders of the Roman Catholic, Anglican and protestant churches to open direct contacts with Renamo leaders to pave way for negotiations. Peace talks then began in 1990 in Rome leading to the signing of a General Peace agreement in 1992. The United Nations became instrumental in the elaboration of the technical documents related to the General Peace Agreement and a general mandate to monitor its implementation and to organise elections. Other critical roles of the organ were peace keeping, supervising demobilisation of armies and return of refugees, provision of humanitarian relief and electoral support.

The church's intervention, especially the Catholic Church, which represents the largest supra-ethnic organisation in Mozambican civil society, played a key role in brokering local ceasefire and defusing community tensions. Churches made public calls for a negotiated end to the war as early as 1983 and by 1988 they were facilitating contacts between the government and Renamo representatives. This was after gaining the confidence of rebel leaders through personal visits to their headquarters leading to the Rome talks and eventually the Rome Accord which brought peace to the country.

Financial incentives, first from the Italian government secured Renamo's compliance with the agreement then a UN trust fund set up to finance Renamo's transformation including international pledges for reconstruction fostered sustainable peace. Rituals for appeasing spirits of the dead as part of national healing process promoted reconciliation especially at grassroots level.

When there was relative peace in the country after the agreements were signed, large-scale social development



There are some lessons that Zimbabwe can draw from experiences of other countries that have been involved in conflict situations.

programmes were launched to pave way for a radical transformation of the social and material base of the country as well as improve the social well-being of previously marginalised groups. Privately owned schools, hospitals and missions were rapidly nationalised and the number of schools doubled, while the number of clinics quadrupled within a decade. This won the government widespread international acclaim and popularity. Democratic elections led to the establishment of a cabinet with higher technical qualifications than previous administrations and an improved balance of age, ethnicity and gender. The issue of ethnicity was an important one as it ensured representation of all ethnic groups and therefore it prevented future conflicts along ethnic lines.

Uganda

Religious leaders played critical roles in promoting Uganda's peace and reconciliation in 1997 by facilitating the resumption of talks that had collapsed. Church leaders resolved to engage directly in peace building rather than being centres of support for thousands seeking shelter from the violence. Church leaders organised peace training workshops in 1996 and held public prayers for peace. They also called for dialogue, advocated for specific policies such as amnesty law, worked to build public consensus for peace through sensitisation and sent the message that the insurgency was never going to be won through the barrel of the gun but involved politicians, the Diaspora and civil society. These efforts facilitated the formation of inter-faith groups and this united Anglicans and Catholics who were formerly hostile to each other. The unity of the churches became a symbol of reconciliation at the grassroots level throughout the country.

Women and women's groups played critical roles in the search for peace by becoming community peace builders. Women's groups engaged in demonstrations as a sign of disapproval of the violence. Others sought audience with the president, army commanders and government officials to articulate their concerns and to demand peaceful solution to the conflict. They also sought to draw international attention to the conflict when they held campaigns for the release of girls abducted from St. Mary's school in 1996. The documentation of women's experiences during the conflict using participatory research also helped to empower the women and also generated information for advocacy and lobbying work. Women also formed Community Based Organisations (CBO's) intended to promote reconciliation, re-integration and regeneration. Women's peace building efforts were also directed at reviving cultural institutions with activities such as prayer meetings, peace education and setting up other structures designed to address the consequences of the war. Civil society called upon government to offer a comprehensive amnesty to encourage fighters to return home at the same time capacitating communities to manage effective reconciliation.

“There are disputes over inheritance. When a relative passes away especially the husband relatives fall over each other to get a share of the deceased's property”

Survey respondent, Kwekwe

Community members living in the Diaspora organised international conferences in 1997 and 1998 that brought together civil society, government officials, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), officials from the Sudanese government, representatives from the international community, traditional and religious leaders and many other stakeholders involved in the conflict. These conferences brought widespread awareness of the conflict. The aim of these initiatives was to muster support for an inclusive dialogue process that combined the search for peace dialogue opportunities for the conflict parties and peace education for the communities.

Government also introduced an amnesty bill in 1998 as a means to end an intractable conflict and this targeted especially those in exile who were afraid to return home due to fear of possible prosecution. This was in response to the expressed wishes of the people of Uganda who felt the rebels were themselves victims of violence as most were children who were abducted and forced to fight the war. Institutions of the amnesty were established e.g.

an Amnesty Commission and a Demobilisation and Resettlement Team to oversee the amnesty process including promoting dialogue, sensitisation of communities, drawing up programmes for decommissioning of weapons and resettlement of returnees. Traditional approaches were also important; chiefs led ritual healing processes at the community level and they were also given the jurisdiction to resolve local community disputes and to mediate where necessary. Indirectly, this resulted in the reconstruction of societal and cultural institutions whose fabric had historically been broken.

Angola

The Angolan private print and broadcast media were important instruments and allies of the peace movement. The emergence of private newspapers throughout the 1990s created new arenas for communication and debate around the conflict in the country, a situation which was not possible with state-run media institutions. Key issues on the political conflict were openly discussed on radio phone-in-programmes whilst the print media published 'opinion pieces' which were useful to the on-going political conflict.

The political reforms which preceded the signing of the Bicesse Accords in 1991 legalized the creation of independent associations, thus leading to the visibility of civil society organisations in Angola. Among the first civic organisations to be formed were the Angolan Action for Development (AAD); Action for Rural Development and the Environment (ADRA), which both focused initially on reconstruction and agriculture; and the Angolan Civic Association (ACA), which was concerned with civil and political rights. Civil society organisations promoted human rights, trained human rights activists and educated the population on constructive use of the media, building citizen awareness through supporting radio programmes and the publication of material in the print media. Interest was also vested in influencing the content of the new Angolan constitution.

Throughout the 1990s, the emergence of civil society peace actors and the promotion of new peace initiatives were of considerable significance in Angola. It had the effect of creating a 'vehicle' for mobilization outside the political structures. Towards the end of the 1990s, the civil society organisations in Angola sought to influence political decision-making. Their greatest strength lied in the ability to understand and promote 'peace' as the creation of an equitable and just society; with inclusive political structures; an accountable and transparent government. Civic organisations also promoted peace as a means to achieving economic and social development; freedom of opinion and association; the safeguarding of human rights and development of a representative national constitution.

Angolan churches played a key role at the forefront of the peace movement. Their legitimacy and influence were strong in both urban and rural areas, and also reached grassroots levels. There were three main church organisations influential in promoting the peace-building initiatives in Angola. These were the Council of Christian Churches of Angola (CICA); the Angolan Evangelical Alliance (AEA), representing the major Protestant Churches (Methodist, Baptist, Congregational, etc); and the Angolan Catholic Church. The churches were involved in the creation of the Peace Building Programme (PCP) in late 1998 which sought to promote practical local responses in Angola's provinces and strengthen sustainable conflict management capacities at the grassroots level.

In realisation that the churches lacked a shared ecumenical approach to peace building, the Inter-Ecclesial Committee for Peace in Angola (COIEPA) was formed in 1999. The COIEPA was established as an ecumenical peace forum which sought to bring the Angolan churches together and provide a focus for dialogue with the international community. In this vain COIEPA became a key advocacy institution of the Angolan peace movement advocating for dialogue as the only means to a lasting peace solution. The new initiatives in Angola recognised the role of resource management in building sustainable peace. Poor governance, particularly in the area of natural resources management, allegedly fuelled armed conflict and poor performance in economic and social development. National institutions failed to curb

corrupt activities of state officials with weak enforcement of policies in place. Thus, resource management was a key area that international organisations had to work on in order to enhance the capacity of state institutions. It had been noted that frustration and anger due to escalating levels of poverty and social inequality were creating rivalries within the elite over access to the oil rent and other economic opportunities perpetuating conflict. Ultimately, the quality of resource management was considered a key factor in determining whether Angola would succeed in achieving long-term sustainable peace or would succumb again to new forms of conflict.

Women also participated actively in the Angolan peace processes. Their most vocal participation in political life centred on the promotion of women's rights. The Organisation of Angolan Women (OMA) played critical roles in fighting for the improvement of women's legal status, economic empowerment, and integration of women's issues into mainstream policies. Their efforts in the 1980s led to the introduction of the Family Code and formulation and implementation of a policy to provide free family planning to women. OMA also provided technical assistance to women and encouraged debate and discussion on previously taboo subjects such as customary marriage and abortion. Some women's organisations have worked in the area of reproductive rights, child vaccination, and campaigned against violence against women.

Other countries in brief

Peace initiatives have been implemented in several other countries including: Peru, El Salvador, Chile, Argentina, East Timor and South Africa. In Peru, a seven-member commission was set up to investigate human rights violations carried out during a twenty-year conflict that ended in the mid-1990s (Human Rights Watch, 2002). The commission's tasks were to discover the causes of the political violence, to aid the courts in clarifying criminal responsibility, to elaborate proposal for reparation for the victims and their families and to establish mechanisms to follow up implementation of its recommendations (CCMT, 2004). In East Timor, an independent commission was formed to investigate human rights violations committed by various people between April 1974 and October 1999. The commission facilitated community reconciliation with justice for those who committed less serious offences (CCMT, 2004).

Another significant reconciliation process took place in South Africa under the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), a court-like body assembled after the abolition of apartheid. Witnesses that had been identified as victims of gross human rights violations were invited to give statements about their experiences, and some were selected for public hearings. Perpetrators of violence also gave testimony and requested amnesty from both civil and criminal prosecution. The TRC, the first of the nineteen held internationally to stage public hearings, was seen by many as a crucial component of the transition to full and free democracy in South Africa. Despite some flaws, it was generally (although not universally) considered to have been successful.

Although varying in their successes, the above-mentioned examples of peace initiatives shared some characteristics. One common element was that most of the commissions' mandates were generally silent on the participation of individuals and their communities in the reconciliation process (CCMT, 2004).

3.7.1 Assessment of effectiveness of country-context peace building initiatives

The main objective of the analysis of the conflict situations in the above country examples is to draw lessons that help to provide a guide to the development of sustainable conflict resolution strategies, policies, and instruments for conflict management in Zimbabwe. As evident in the above case studies, the root causes of the conflicts were different and occurred at different times and also called for country-specific approaches to bring conflicting parties back to the path of peace and development.

There was a general lack of a comprehensive conflict analysis in the Zimbabwean context. There was need for the

major players to have a clear understanding of the issues at stake as well as how these issues could be addressed. In order for the negotiation processes to be successful, an understanding of the dynamics of the conflicts (in-depth knowledge of the historical, political, social and economic context) and the interests of the parties in conflict was imperative in guaranteeing cooperation. Flexibility of programmes and greater responsiveness to the needs of affected groups was viewed as a means to shortening peace processes.

The effectiveness of international interventions was lessened by the perceived dependence upon the provision of resources and humanitarian aid with limited understanding of the historical as well as the evolution of the political, economic and social landscapes in Zimbabwe. Many peace pacts in several countries failed because of pervasive donor ignorance of the realities of the warring parties and the lived realities of the ordinary citizens. More specifically, in the Zimbabwean context, the international community did not adequately understand the role of economic inequalities in Zimbabwe, particularly the land question and its role in causing conflict in Zimbabwe.

Civil society's participation in peace building at the grassroots and in capacity development was generally considered a success. Zimbabwe had generally been against listening to alternative voices, yet solutions to community problems could not be generated at the centre without the active participation of people in defining their real needs. Active community participation tended to help communities shape their social and economic destiny and to assume responsibility for their own welfare. In this regard, communities were able to identify, design and implement community programmes that best addressed their situation.

3.7.2 Challenges in implementing peace initiatives in Zimbabwe

Several challenges were encountered in efforts to create a peaceful environment in Zimbabwe. Some of the main challenges encountered in peace building work in Zimbabwe include:

- Difficulties in re-engaging the international community because there were still concerns over allegations of human rights violations (e.g. new farm invasions, and continued arrests of opposition officials).
- The absence of international and bilateral partners made the reconstruction process slow due to poor funding levels and therefore prolonged the reversal of deterioration in economic and social indicators. The country required financial support for reforms to take place but the international community was reluctant in releasing funds without evidence of a genuine shift towards rule of law, transparency, good governance and democracy. As a result, donors have remained sceptical about the GPA and few observers have seen tangible progress on political reform.
- There was limited use of the participatory approaches including a lack of a formalized and permanent consultation with civil society and the business sector.
There was a general lack of strong institutional mechanisms to strengthen governance and democracy in the country.
- Lack of trust between the various stakeholders which include government, business and civil society and the difficulty of attracting venture capital in an environment where property rights were being infringed.
- The difficulty experienced in accessing accurate information regarding the nature and extent of political crisis as well as credible, organised and accountable mechanisms to channel assistance to Zimbabwe (Council for Zimbabwe, 2008).
- A dispersed skills base, lack of organised civil society engagement in policy processes, poor internal and external links, eroded work ethics, a lack of reliable information, poor mentorship and lack of a common vision (Council for Zimbabwe, 2008).
- Absence of a committed budget for the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), the body charged with monitoring the September pact, which tended to affect their effectiveness in pursuing their mandate.

3.7.3 Stakeholder Analysis

Organisation of stakeholders provides critical forums for discussing issues and processes in peace-building, sharing experiences, ideas and best practices related to peace building, as well as mobilising resources for conflict prevention and management in Zimbabwe. Effective coordination of programmes in peace-building and strengthening local ownership and leadership requires that stakeholders involved in peace building initiatives work closely together. A number of such institutions and civic organisations exist in Zimbabwe (See Chapter 6). More importantly, the engagement of key stakeholders from government-related institutions in the peace-building processes remains an essential element in the programming of peace building initiatives in the country. Some of the key government institutions include:

- Ministry for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration
- Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs
- Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP),
- Zimbabwe Prison Service (ZPS)
- Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA)
- Ministry of Youth and Employment Creation
- Local Authorities
- Ministry of Industry and Economic Development

Other relevant institutions in peace building work involve international institutions like the Training for Peace in Africa whose capacity development programme focuses on improving and building self-sustaining African civilian and strengthened African security architecture to support peace operations. African Capacity Building Foundation is another international institution whose focus is to help build capacity for sustainable development and poverty reduction by providing financial and technical support needed to strengthen economic policy analysis and development management.

The starting point for successful engagement in resolving the conflict in Zimbabwe is to take the contextual issues around the conflict into account. It is essential that both local and international actors have a good understanding of the specific context of the country in order to develop strategic responses that would address the interests of the parties involved in the conflict. Therefore, constraints relating to capacity, the unequal balance of power between the parties, existing governance problems, ideological impasse, the crisis around political legitimacy and reasons for lack of political will need to be considered. Failure to recognise these weaknesses would make it impossible to effectively engage into consultations with the government. The analysis has to go beyond the quantitative indicators of conflict like cases of political violence, murders and so on, putting more focus on relationships, correcting governance, enhancing institutional strength and identification of the interests of the parties lest the resolution of the conflict takes longer than necessary.

There is competing emphasis on state sovereignty and regime change. Respectful engagement should thus aim to lessen the tensions between the parties and inculcate a culture of conflict prevention. It is important to have designated institutional focal points within the government and collaborating institutions, whether local or international, with capacity and technical support in developing own conflict prevention strategies. Respectful engagement should also allow collaborating partners to understand the root cause of the conflict in Zimbabwe which in turn allows civil society to develop more effective endogenous transformative strategies towards ending the conflict.

Chapter 4: Summary of conflicts reported during the survey

4.1. Masvingo Province

Bikita District

Traditional leaders such as chiefs, headmen and local village leaders were accused of being perpetrators of political violence. This resulted in perpetual conflict between the traditional leaders and the communities themselves. The effective role of traditional leaders was heavily compromised. During the campaign for the 2008 presidential runoff elections, Chiefs allegedly demanded peoples' livestock (cattle, goats, chicken) as fines for supporting the opposition party. Community members showed a lack of trust amongst each other because of political violence. There was hatred generated over political differences; with people no longer coming together as neighbours even at such occasions as funerals.

The perpetrators of violence were still walking freely in the communities they had terrorised with no compensation or any form of restitution being made available to the victims of political violence. Purported youth militia were described to be disturbing normal education programmes by interfering with schools, in so doing, creating conflict with teachers and students. There were reports of teachers and students being forced to attend political gatherings during school times. Headmen allegedly forced people to engage in traditional or ancestral rituals regardless of one's cultural or religious beliefs.

Chivi District

The poorest sections of the population in the local communities who were supposed to benefit from food distributions in relief aid were allegedly excluded because of their political affiliation resulting in tension between facilitators of aid (such as chiefs and councillors) and targeted beneficiaries. Politicians were accused of threatening people with all sorts of violence in order to sway their political inclination in their favour.

Land disputes between different villages were also reported. Some villages that did not have well defined administrative boundaries had age old conflicts over grazing lands. Family members were reported to be in disputes over fields inherited from deceased parents. Kraal heads allegedly reserved communal land for their descendants whilst other community members were advised to go for land allocation on seized farms. High levels of stock theft were also reported to be causing conflict in the Chivi rural areas.

Masvingo Urban

There was an alleged partisan allocation of market stalls by local council officials, with indications that opposition party members were excluded. Children of school going age noted that parents and guardians were struggling to pay school fees due to high unemployment levels and liquidity challenges. Parents were irked by the failure to report for duties by several teachers who in turn were citing poor working conditions and remuneration. Labour disputes were also reported to be wide spread as employers were failing to pay workers fair wages, thus creating conflict between owners of business and workers.

The Masvingo City Council was accused of levying residents heavily whilst on the other hand offering poor or no services at all. This encompassed refuse collection not done consistently as evidenced by piling up of garbage all over the town; erratic supply of treated water for household use; and high frequency of electricity power cuts. The City council was accused of not doing anything to redress the situation or address residents.

Conflict was also reported around issues to do with inheritance of property left by the deceased, with common

cases of widows being persecuted by relatives of the deceased husbands especially over the distribution of the deceased's estate. Women in polygamous marriages reported conflicts among themselves which sometimes resulted in unprecedented violence. There were also disputes over ownership of resettlement stands between ward coordinators and party chairpersons as land boundary pegs placed by responsible authorities had since been removed through acts of vandalism.

4.2. Manicaland Province

Mutasa District

Community members in Mutasa District allegedly no longer trusted each other because of differences in party politics which had destroyed the spirit of good neighbourliness. Political party leaderships were accused of promoting acts of political violence in order to gain people's support. School-going children noted that parents were finding it difficult to pay school fees leading to an increase in the number children out of school. There were allegations that the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM), a public fund created to help pay education fees for poor children was not easily accessible with the selection criteria reportedly being biased.

Chimanimani District

It was reported that victims of political violence watched helplessly as their perpetrators continued to enjoy the use of personal property that was illegally seized in 2008 at the height of political violence, whilst little or nothing had been done to bring these people to justice. It is alleged such perpetrators of violence actually claimed to be above the law. It was highlighted that some senior politicians had threatened rural communities with death if they continued supporting opposition parties. Parents and students were reported to be angry at teachers for not performing their teaching duties all the times as required; whilst teachers on the other hand continued to demand better employment conditions and remuneration.

Mutare Urban

In Mutare Urban, it was reported that the political environment had changed the living conditions in the communities that were once characterised by peace and tranquillity to an environment of hate. There were allegations that informal market stalls were being allocated on the basis of party allegiance; leading to widespread dispute on the allocation of the stands in urban flea markets.

Mutare residents also expressed disappointment with the poor service delivery by city council especially concerning the piling up of refuse, failure to urgently repair burst sewer pipes, and repair of pot holes whilst on the other hand rates continued to soar high. Communities were not happy with the service by ZESA especially the huge bills sent out to consumers when in actual effect power cuts were the order of the day. The economic meltdown was also reported to have resulted in many people losing their sources of income, subjecting households to increased poverty, strained relationships between spouses and a subsequent increase in domestic violence cases.

4.3. Mashonaland East Province

Murehwa District

In Murehwa District, economic problems were reported to have created disputes as people were struggling to make ends meet and thus ended up engaging in all sorts of activities for money. This included illegal activities like burglary and stock theft which were reportedly on the rise in communal areas. It was not uncommon that these thefts were being committed by relatives and friends. High adult mortality especially due to HIV and AIDS was reported to be disturbing people's normal lives in that some family members were accusing each other of having caused the deaths

in the family through witch craft.

Farmers that were settled on the seized farms were accused of seeking to enslave former farm workers by denying them small pieces of land to grow their own food, unless they agreed to work for them for little or no pay at all. Those who refused to work under these conditions were branded opposition party supporters resulting in all sorts of harassment or even eviction from old farm houses.

Marondera District

People in Marondera District were reported to be living in fear of being attacked and generally no longer trusted each other, especially around election periods. A culture of violence and intimidation had been founded in the communities along political lines. Domestic violence due to the harsh economic environment was also reported to be on the increase.

Alleged poor service delivery by central government and local authorities including power cuts and bursting of old water pipes, exacerbated by astronomical bills were also reported to be creating a bitter relationship between service providers and residents.

Mutoko District

Food shortages in the District due to frequent droughts, compounded by the alleged unfair distribution of food from state institutions were described to have created conflict between village heads, chiefs and their communities. People who had lost their property including livestock in the 2008 violent election campaigns knew who had stolen their livestock and demanded it be returned but unfortunately the perpetrators were seemingly above the law. Any claim on property looted during election campaigns was allegedly viewed as a criminal offence and could lead to the victim being reprimanded. It was reported that victims of political violence were vying for revenge on the members of the community who were known to have perpetrated violence during election periods. It is alleged that nothing had been done to bring the perpetrators to book.

4.4. Mashonaland Central Province

Bindura District (Rural)

Land disputes on resettlement farms were reported in the District, with allegations that highly placed people in political parties or government circles were using their political muscle to displace initially settled farmers. There were also disputes reported between newly settled farmers and former farm workers; with the latter refusing to work for the new farmers because of poor wages. The former farm workers were legally supposed to remain on the farms and were entitled to pieces of land to fend for their lives, but instead, the new farmers reportedly violently evicted the former workers from the old farm compounds.

Bindura District (Urban)

It was reported that institutions and corporations were failing to pay their workers wages in line with the poverty datum line and thus creating disputes over wage and salary increases between employees and employers. Residents were allegedly not happy with the poor service delivery by city council with specific mention to refuse remaining uncollected for long periods; sewage bursts taking long to be attended to; poor state of road network and generally high rates. The economic crisis was also cited to have ushered in a new era marked by a high rate of prostitution, involving stranded students in colleges, unemployed girls in the communities, and many married men have been reported to be the main culprits promoting this behaviour, thus causing conflicts within the households.

Mt. Darwin District

Damages caused by past political violence were reportedly not addressed and thus cries for justice by the victims continued unheard. It is alleged, perpetrators of violence continued to enjoy life unperturbed, threatening new waves of violence should people refuse to change their political allegiance. Members from different political parties were reportedly living in constant conflict. Villagers allegedly accused their headmen of leading the acts of political violence in 2008. It is reported people were now confronting the traditional leaders demanding their property taken during 2008 election political violence.

4.5. Mashonaland West Province

Kariba District

In Kariba District, conflict was reported between landlord and tenants/lodgers over rentals whereby many tenants were finding it difficult to pay their rents on time leading to evictions without due notice. There were also reports of wage disputes between workers and employers which had been raging on for a long time due to many enterprises failing to pay the living wage demanded by workers and their unions in the face of a depressed economy.

Hurungwe District

Politically motivated violence was reported to have split communities apart as the people from the same villages as their victims were involved in assault and abduction of neighbours. Communities believed there had been no justice done over 2008 political violence victims who continued to live together with unrepentant perpetrators in the same community. People who lost their livestock and property in political violence allegedly witnessed their perpetrators enjoying the use of their property. There were also reports of political affiliations being taken into account during distribution of food hand outs including food from state institutions with village heads, councillors and chiefs being accused of perpetrating the unfair practice.

Chinhoyi District

In Chinhoyi District, children were reportedly disrupted in school attendance due to failure by their parents to pay the exorbitant school fees in the wake of a depressed economy characterised by unprecedented levels of unemployment. Economic problems were also cited as leading to an increase in cases of domestic violence, with women being the worst affected group.

Disputes between ZESA and people over high electricity bills and too frequent power cuts were also cited. Municipality police and ZRP allegedly harassed vendors and anyone suspected of vending and thus leading to tensions between residents and these agents. Labour disputes between new farmers and former farm workers were also highlighted. It is reported newly settled farmers wanted former farm workers to work for them for free or risk being evicted from the farms whilst former farm workers were demanding better wages for their labour.

4.6. Matabeleland North Province

Hwange District

It is alleged there were misunderstandings in the District between tribes especially on issues around the atrocities of the early 1980s in which victims believed that the whole violence was perpetrated along tribal lines. Since the formation of MDC, it is reported people no longer trusted each other since many had fallen victim to political violence perpetrated by members of their own community. There were also disputes between civil servants and their employers over salaries and as a result communities felt they were not receiving the public services they were entitled to. Domestic violence was also reported to be on the increase with women being the common victims.

Lupane District

In Lupane District, there were reports of neighbours fighting over pieces of land as no proper allocation of land had been done in the communal lands. Neighbouring villages were also reportedly involved in disputes over grazing land since villages did not have well demarcated boundaries. There were common disputes over sharing of property of the deceased with widows and children suffering the most. Counter accusations over witchcraft between families and neighbours were also reported to be on the rise because of the high death rates in the villages.

Binga District

In Binga District, it is alleged, innocent communal people were living in fear due to some threats of violence by senior politicians and supporters of the different political parties. Conflict between political parties was also reported as some political parties were accused of using force to gain support of the local communities.

4.7. Matabeleland South Province

Umzingwane District

In Umzingwane District, conflict was reported between the old and young members of the community. The young members in the community had different ideologies from the elderly community members due to such attributes as global change whilst on the other hand, the elderly community members continued to maintain their old fashioned way of doing things. The elderly members in the community were accused of using the youth as political functionaries to their ends. The resulting conflict has purportedly contributed to the huge out-migration of youths into neighbouring countries like South Africa in search for economic independence; whilst back home it has led to an upsurge of households headed by grandmothers and children.

Gwanda District

In Gwanda District, conflict was reported between councillors and the residents on issues of development whereby councillors were accused of corruption and pursuing parochial party and personal interests at the expense of delivering essential public goods and services in the communities. Differences in political beliefs were reported to have divided communities along party lines thereby hampering community cohesion and unity. As a result of this polarization, there was an increase in reports of retributive justice as previous victims of political violence had now embarked on a re-claiming campaign of lost property including stolen livestock. Communities were reported to be claiming back their properties taken during the violent election campaigns and at the same time demanding from Government retributive justice to take place as a process to restore peace and harmony in their communities. Communities argued that mere pardoning tended to promote a culture of violence with impunity, thus perpetrators had to face the full wrath of the law; otherwise any other form of justice would simply make a mockery of the victim.

Bulilima District

Churches in Bulilima District were reported to be splitting due to church leaders fighting for leadership positions. It was acknowledged however that this occurrence was also common in other Districts making it an issue of national concern. Acts of violence due to minor disagreements purportedly over food shortages were also reported in the District. Politicians were reported to be interfering with relief food aid brought in through donor supported programmes and in so doing causing some deserving community members to be excluded from such aid.

4.8. Midlands Province

Gokwe North

In Gokwe North District, political differences were reported to be causing violence to occur between members of the

same community and sometimes even amongst relatives. Youths were allegedly forced to participate in overnight political party vigils, by political party militia irregardless of their political affiliation. Misunderstandings between the Department of Parks and Wild life and the communities were also reported. Conflict in this regard was reportedly being caused by the continuous destruction of peoples' fields by wild animals, whilst Parks authorities failed to effectively deal with the problem despite numerous complaints from the communities.

Kwekwe District

Land disputes were reported in Kwekwe District. These were attributed to unfair allocation of land which allegedly was being done on partisan lines. Domestic violence was also cited as inducing stress in many women in the area, with related cases of women being brutally assaulted by their male spouses on the increase. Parents and guardians were incensed by teachers not reporting for work despite having struggled to raise the required school fees. There were also disputes among church members over places of worship and leadership positions creating bad blood between parishioners of the same denomination.

Gweru District

In Gweru District, high rentals were reported to be creating conflict between property owners and tenants. Disputes were also reported between companies like ZESA and the communities as a result of unjustifiable electricity bills which were considered too high given the frequent power cuts. Communities also complained about burst sewer pipes that were not being attended to urgently and that refuse was piling up all over the city whilst surprisingly, the local authority continued to increase and demand high rates. Disputes were also observed over property sharing between divorced parents. The District also reported conflict between municipal police and street vendors in which municipal police were accused of always chasing after vendors and making them pay spot fines for illegally selling their wares in town.

Bulawayo Metropolitan

In Bulawayo Metropolitan, it was reported rivalry existed between politicians (Councillors) and the resident's association body over the poor quality of service delivery by the municipality. It was also alleged, people were abducted from their houses after being 'sold-out' by their neighbours and this had increased the levels of mistrust amongst community members. Youths who used to coexist in harmony were reported to have formed divisions along party politics leading to frequent gang fights linked to different political parties especially around election time.

Allocation of flea-market stalls created conflicts amongst people with allegations that council officials and senior government officials were involved in allocating stands on political party lines. There were also reports of unfair distribution of donated maize-meal, with people claiming party politics were involved. This had created animosity and grudges between those responsible for the distribution and the intended beneficiaries.

Conflict was also noted between parents and teachers with the latter insisting teachers had a mandate to perform their duties as usual whilst on the other hand, teachers continued to place demands for incentives from parents to complement their low incomes. Tenants reported difficulties in raising rental fees leading to many of them being eventually evicted. Tenants however felt property owners were being too harsh on them given the poor state of the economy. This situation was worse for War Veterans who were believed to be in permanent dispute with property owners as they expected everyone to respect and obey them since they fought in the liberation war.

Due to the economic hardships, some community members were reported to have set up a brothel under the guise of overnight accommodation, which was creating conflict with neighbouring community members. Church members were also reported to be in leadership disputes, with some denominations conflicting over the use of church properties

whilst on the other hand the police were accused of taking sides in resolving the dispute. Witchcraft accusations between neighbours because of too many deaths and economic misfortunes were also cited as causing conflict in the communities. Infidelity amongst couples was reported to be on the increase because of the economic problems the country was going through and contributing to cases of domestic violence.

4.9 Harare Metropolitan Province

Harare

In Harare, some churches were reported to be splitting up due to church leaders fighting over leadership positions and church premises; in some instances state security agents were accused of supporting rival church factions. The allocation of flea market stalls allegedly created conflict amongst people as only those linked to certain political party leaders purportedly secured these strategic marketing stalls. Municipal police with the assistance of the ZRP were accused of tormenting vendors and ordinary residents alike much to the disappointment of the city's residents.

Residents of Harare were reported to be in a bitter dispute with the city council over water supplies, with some areas indicating they received council water only two days per week whilst some communities claimed they had not received council water in their homes for close to six months. Communities were irked by the fact that city council continued to send them high water bills despite failure to supply water. Communities were reportedly not happy with the service by ZESA. Communities complained that electricity bills were being sent out to consumers and yet electricity supply was highly erratic.

Land disputes were also reported between residents from different suburbs over claims of ownership of agricultural fields on the outskirts of suburbs to grow crops. Parents and guardians were at conflict with teachers who were accused of not performing their normal duties despite the exorbitant fees paid by parents. Teachers on the other hand cited poor remuneration and were demanding incentives from parents. Cases of domestic violence were also reported to be on the increase, with the female spouses being the most common victims.

4.10.2. Chitungwiza

In Chitungwiza District, there were reports of unjustified politically motivated unlawful arrests of civic society members and ordinary community members. This had brewed antagonism between communities and the partisan state security agents. There were also reports of unfair allocation of residential stands by leaders and councillors which had created a rift between council officials and the public. It is alleged that council officials were taking bribes to expedite the process of allocating residential stands, whilst many other people had to endure being on the housing waiting list for longer periods. Disputes were also reported over the distribution of the deceased's estate, with the conflict often pitting widows and the late husbands' relatives.



Residents of Harare were reported to be in a bitter dispute with the city council over water supplies, with some areas indicating they received council water only two days per week.

political and socio-economic inequalities brought about by colonialism and by the failure of government to address these disparities after attaining independence. The land issue was central to the political debate in Zimbabwe. Whilst it is recognised that conflict is inevitable among human beings, it is the failure to manage and resolve such conflicts in a holistic manner that has resulted in many individuals and communities hurting in all dimensions of wellness; physically, emotionally, mentally, socially and spiritually. Disharmony has disrupted the mind, spirit and body; subsequently leading to a society lapse into an abnormal state of being which has negatively affected the country's body politic. Social well-being and economic prosperity presupposes harmony, tolerance of diversity and mutual acceptance and this can only be realised through reconciliation efforts.

It can be argued that the state of hurt in the Zimbabwean society was actually an accumulation of unresolved conflicts characterised by gruelling repression, crippling fear, harassment, torture, abductions, murder and victimisation. Many people fought, maimed, betrayed and killed their brothers, mothers, sisters, fathers, neighbours and fellow Zimbabweans, for political gains. In the majority of cases, both those directly and indirectly affected were suffering from psychological trauma and stress, living in morbid fear and a great sense of insecurity.

It is therefore crucial that there be economic sanity in the nation given that the country's economy has the potential to recover from the unprecedented crisis. The period 2000 to 2009 was characterised by astronomic inflation levels, high levels of national debt, dearth of the local currency, crippling poverty, high food insecurity, high levels of unemployment, shortages of basic necessities, poor public service delivery, the criminalisation of the average citizen, collapsed financial system with industry operating below 20% capacity among many other challenges.

Peace building was understood as the process of breaking down the barriers that blocked ways towards the development of "peaceful societies" as well as building bridges of trust that had been destroyed by the recent past marked by violence and intolerance of diversities across the divides. Therefore, the country needed to develop collectively a national vision buttressed by values and beliefs that define the Zimbabwean people. The national values have to recognise the humanity of every individual in the society, helping in deciding how citizens could co-exist respectably. These values include spirituality and morality; unity in diversity; respect for the sanctity of human life and dignity; respect for democratic freedoms; equity and equality; democracy and good governance; public participation in decision making processes; upholding justice and the rule of law; and promoting the common good.

It was evident in the study that most communities had been systematically disempowered as they could not openly express their opinions or access information that was relevant and timely for their own benefit. Conducting educational and awareness campaigns has served to assist communities in becoming peace conscious; recognising the various levels of interdependency that exist. Local leaders occupy very strategic and influential positions in communities, with the traditional leaders and pastors being held in high esteem as the models and gate-keepers of societal values, customs and harmony, thus they need to be recognised as major players in terms of promoting peace and community healing processes.

Conflicts and violence in the country were caused by attitudes, behaviours, structures and systems that were destructive in nature or by design. (Attitudes- fear, insecurity, inferiority or superiority, hatred, intolerance and ignorance; Behaviours- intimidation, violence; Structures- discrimination, injustice and exclusion; and Systems- corruption, patronage, impunity etc.) There is therefore need to promote governance systems which promote individual self-confidence, trust, tolerance, respect, creativity and community development based upon structures that promote equity, equality and inclusion; celebrating diversity in society.

The study advocates for the need to adopt the following strategies at the various levels of programming:

- I. There is need for the creation of a people-driven constitution as the existing Constitution has been allegedly manipulated to serve sectoral and partisan interests. The unequal power relations at play at the various levels of the society need to be curtailed in order to promote peace building.
- II. Security sector reforms are needed in ensuring security sector becomes more useful in providing security to citizens without protecting the interests of a few elites. There is also need to demilitarise strategic state institutions such as RBZ, GMB, NOCZIM, NRZ and ZEC.
- III. Concerted effort should be directed towards strengthening the Organ of National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration and further prioritise reconstruction initiatives nationally.
- IV. Early warning systems including the analysis and development of communication strategies that raise public awareness for emerging conflicts need to be improved.
- V. International organisations should play a pivotal role in supporting civil society and in encouraging government to recognise the role that civil society plays in conflict prevention and peace-building. This is highly relevant in the de-construction of political perceptions, options for action, strategies and alliances which are also important steps towards mapping a long-term national vision.
- VI. There was an urgent need to come up with strategies on socio-economic recovery and reconstruction and also mitigation of the effects of HIV and AIDS.
- VII. Conducting Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) to establish the conditions that were responsible for the escalation of the conflict in the first place and would be important in developing strategies to address the root causes of the conflict.
- VIII. Zimbabweans in the Diaspora needed to be engaged in the peace building work. The Council for Zimbabwe (2008) underscored the need for facilitation between the Zimbabwean government and those in the Diaspora to create operational policies and an enabling environment to ensure that the process of helping Zimbabwe was coordinated, accountable, effective and efficient. Similar dialogues like the 'homelink' initiative needed to be re-introduced in order to create an understanding between government and individuals who were willing to assist in the delivery of social and economic services.
- IX. There was need to establish a Truth Commission. Since the early 1990s, the international human rights community has advocated truth commissions as an important part of the healing process of virtually every international or communal conflict that has come to an end. It is argued that some reckoning with the past is necessary in order for former opponents to look to a peaceful shared future.

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